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Since the early 1990’s, tourism development has been promoted to replace employment 
lost to downsizing, outsourcing and automation in both urban and rural America. These efforts 
are actively supported by state and local chambers of commerce. However, despite the 
enthusiasm for tourism within city halls and business membership organizations, planning 
theorists have expressed concerns about the wage structure of the industry. Specifically, given 
the significant public investment in the industry, planners are being asked by some theorists to 
consider the distribution of economic benefits between labor and capital. This dissertation 
explores this issue and concludes with a study focused on the origins and distribution of public 
economic benefits – areas that have received little attention to date. Using Power to Tax theory 
as a theoretical framework a strong relationship was established between hotel revenue per capita 
(a proxy for hotel taxes) and local government wages per capita. The study found no association 
between natural amenities and local government wages per capita, independent of the path 
through hotel revenue per capita. These findings suggest local government officials are enriching 
themselves by commodifying their commons (natural amenities) through the low-wage tourism 
industry.  Recommendations are made to Fainstein’s Just City planning model to advance a more 
equitable distribution of public economic benefits derived from natural amenities and the local 
residents toiling in the tourism industry. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Interest in tourism grew in the early 1990s as cities and rural communities struggled to 
retain traditional employers. Today, public officials across the United States and their economic 
advisers champion the cause of tourism by using economic models to show how tourist spending 
gets converted, among other things, to restaurant tabs and then to employee wages.  In turn, these 
employee wages are used to buy consumables that bolster the economy.  This logic has inspired 
public-private partnerships to develop hotels, attract visitors and build comfortable meeting 
spaces and entertainment venues for their enjoyment.  Cities battle vigorously among each other, 
competing in bidding wars to host conventions, sporting events and various forms of 
entertainment to attract visitors to their community.  However, the enthusiasm for chasing tourist 
dollars within town halls and chambers of commerce is not without detractors. Urban theorists 
and rural economists have raised concerns about the negative consequences of competitive 
planning, the distribution of economic benefits from tourism and, specifically, how this 
distribution impacts the wage structure within the industry (Fainstein, 2010; Harvey, 2012; 
Marcouiller et al., 2004). 
At the onset of the tourism revival, the burden for addressing the wage structure in the 
tourism industry was left to labor organizations and community organizers (Judd & Fainstein, 
1999). Susan Fainstein revisited the topic in The Just City (2010). Based on two decades of 
public investment in tourism-related subsectors, and without any measurable progress increasing 
the wage structure of front-line employees, Fainstein argues for regulating private investment in 
the industry and “injecting concerns of justice into policy making” (Fainstein, 2010, pp. 179–
183).  David Harvey expressed similar sentiments in Rebel Cities (2012) after observing an array 




of private profiteers trading on tourist attractions built and maintained with public investment.  
Harvey considers these profit-taking practices an appropriation of capital that belongs to the 
community: “why let the monopoly rent attached to that symbolic capital [tourist attractions] be 
captured only by the multinationals, or by a small, powerful segment of the bourgeoisie?” 
(Harvey, 2012, pp. 105–106). To address the issue, Fainstein argues that public officials should 
provide accurate information on the distribution of private economic benefits within the tourism 
industry so the debate in City Halls can shift from promoting tourism development to concerns 
of equity (Fainstein, 2010).  
Notably missing from Fainstein’s and Harvey’s arguments, however, is consideration of 
the distribution of public economic benefits of tourism (i.e., tax revenue). There are good reasons 
to suspect public economic benefits of tourism accruing to state and local governments are 
material and should be a significant part of any redistribution debate.  A 2014 survey on local 
economic development conducted by the International City Managers Association (ICMA) found 
that among five potential priorities (tax base, jobs, quality of life, environmental sustainability, 
and social equity) city officials ranked increasing the local tax base first and addressing social 
equity last. Of the 32 activities identified to address their priorities, tourism promotion was 
ranked second, only behind quality of life investments like arts, culture, education and recreation 
(Economic Development 2014 Survey Results, 2014). The proximity of increasing revenues (tax 
base) as an end, and tourism promotion as a means, indicates local governments are pursing 
tourism, at least in part, to generate revenue for city coffers. 
Also missing from Fainstein and Harvey’s arguments is consideration of the non-
monetary elements which support tourism. While both refer to public and private investment in 
the built environment to spur tourism, neither address nor value the natural amenities of a 




community which attract visitors. This dimension, where the spark for tourism development is 
rooted in part to natural amenities, has important implications for the distribution of benefits 
derived from what is part of the community commons.  
 
Significance of the Research Topic 
This dissertation explores a vexing issue for local governments; their pursuit of tourism 
under the banner of local economic development, while front-line workers in the hospitality 
subsector are excluded from the economic benefits of the industry.  I begin with a review of the 
distribution of the primary economic benefits in the hospitality subsector and how secondary 
economic benefits are conceptualized and measured in the broader tourism industry. I then turn 
to 1) a review of the literature of external and internal forces associated with changes in the wage 
structure of various service sectors and 2) a review of the public economic benefits associated 
with the hospitality subsector. It is in this last section where I identify significant gaps in the 
existing literature - the origins and distribution of public profits from the hospitality subsector.  
My primary hypothesis, based on one of several theoretical frameworks which can be 
applied to this problem, is that public officials are using tax revenue from tourism for self-
enrichment. Building on previous research, I also hypothesize that there is a causal pathway from 
natural amenities to local government wages through the tax revenue generated from tourism. 
The findings from this study will make a significant contribution to the discourse on the wage 
structure problem in the tourism industry. If the findings indicate public officials are using 
tourism tax revenue for self-enrichment, and that natural amenities are the origins of this 
revenue, it will open a new avenue for discussions on the redistribution of economic benefits and 
the utility of commons planning advocated by Peter Marcuse (Marcuse, 2009).  If the findings do 




not support the hypotheses, it will challenge previous research by public choice economists, and 
focus the wage debate, as Fainstein and Harvey suggested, on the redistribution of private 
economic benefits to address the wage structure issues in the industry. 
Distribution Theories Considered 
Economists have put forward several hypotheses, theories, and concepts to predict how 
profits are, or should be, distributed in the tourism industry– five of which I detail below. The 
first two are offered by two pairs of public choice economists: Richard Musgrave and Peggy 
Musgrave, and Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchannan. These economists view economic 
policy from a presumption that bureaucrats and politicians are rational actors and enter 
government service to pursue their own self-interests (Black et al., 2012). 
Musgrave and Musgrave frame their theory of public expenditures as a “Leviathan 
Hypothesis” based on the classic work of Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes, 1996, p. xx). They suggest 
that, while bureaucrats are motivated by rational self-interests to divert excess tax revenue to 
larger staff and increased salaries, their efforts are counterbalanced by politicians driven to 
increase services desired by a majority of the electorate. In this tug-of war between rational 
interests, the outcome is increased public services (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989). Under this 
hypothesis, local governments would be expected to use excess tax revenue from tourism to 
boost local expenditures that serve the public interest. 
The Power to Tax theory, developed by Geoffrey Brennan and Nobel laureate James 
Buchanan, challenge the Leviathan Hypothesis. Their theory casts public officials as egoistic 
despots, intent on increasing their own compensation and numbers with the taxes they collect, 
and capable of deflecting the spending priorities of elected officials (Brennan & Buchanan, 




2000).  So, while both public choice theories expect public officials to seize opportunities to 
push taxes upward, they differ in characterizing the use of these tax revenues as either 
benevolent or malevolent, respectfully.  
The public good concept can also be used to predict the distribution of economic benefits. 
Espoused by neo-liberal economists, this concept suggests the most efficient use of tourism tax 
revenue is for public expenditures that sustain or develop the tourism sector.  These expenditures 
could include subsidies for convention facilities and visitor attractions, or marketing and 
promotional campaigns to attract visitors. Since private tourism-related businesses do not have a 
mechanism to capture secondary and tertiary benefits of visitor spending, and therefore cannot 
incorporate those revenues into marketing and development, it is left to the public sector to 
capture a portion of this tourism revenue through taxes and invest those proceeds in activities 
that support the industry (Britton, 1991; Dwyer et al., 2010).    
The final two distributive concepts considered here are normative and centered on the 
employee. The first is a proposition from Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith 
argued for wages sufficient for a worker to raise a family on one income. Smith’s rationale was 
that families needed to thrive in order to provide capitalists with a future supply of workers 
(Smith, 1776).  The current Federal minimum wage does not accomplish Smith’s goal, but many 
local governments have moved in that direction by imposing living wage requirements (Reich et 
al., 2014). The second proposition is offered by Karl Marx. He assumed that workers would earn 
a living wage, but argued that this was not sufficient nor just, and that employees should receive 
a portion of business revenues. His labor theory calculated the worth of an employee based on 
their contribution to company revenues (Marx, 1867). Under Marx’s theory, local governments 




would take steps to ensure not only a family wage but would also require profit sharing for 
employees.  
Table 1 illustrates how the application of these models would direct the use of excess tax 
revenue from tourism. 
Table 1: Distribution Theories 
Theory/Concept Proponents Distribution of Tourism 
Taxes  
Power to Tax Brennan and Buchanan  Boost salaries of public 
officials 
Public Good Dwyer et al Tourism promotion and 
facilities  
Leviathan Musgrave and Musgrave Benevolent expenditures for the 
good of the public at large 
Family Wage Adam Smith Employee wages 
Labor Theory of Value Karl Marx Employee profit sharing 
 
The figure below illustrates how these distributive theories and concepts can be viewed 
on a continuum based on outcomes. 




Figure 1: Continuum of Distribution Theories and Concepts 
 
 
For this study, the Power to Tax theory is selected as the framework to investigate the 
distribution of public benefits (i.e., tax revenue) from tourism. There are three reasons for this 
selection. First, using a public choice theory to address social equity issues is supported in public 
administration literature. H. George Frederickson, the first champion for injecting social equity 
into public administration, called for public administrators to address  the principles of public 
choice theory in their pursuit of social equity (Frederickson, 1991).  Second, expenditures on 
local government employees (average salaries and total payroll) are measured annually by the 
U.S. Government and therefore can be operationalized more accurately than the less well-defined 
benevolent expenditures, spending on tourism promotion and marketing, family wages, or 
employee profit sharing. And, finally, recent studies by public choice economists have tested the 
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(Brueckner & Neumark, 2014; Diamond, 2017). This dissertation can build on these recent 
public choice studies, using  standardized variables to measure government employee 
compensation (Gerring, 2012). 
Research Design & Methodology 
The primary research problems being addressed in this dissertation are 1) identifying the 
distribution of public economic benefits from tourism activity and 2) evaluating the role of 
natural amenities in generating tourism activity. The Power to Tax theory is used as the 
theoretical framework for the distribution of benefits and the general hypothesis is that hotel tax 
revenues (independent variable) are being used to boost public employee salaries and overall 
payrolls (dependent variable). In addition, several other research questions emanating from the 
literature review are addressed. These include whether or not the external forces of unionization 
are associated with higher wages in the accommodation (hotel) subsector, and if the differential 
in racial composition between supervisors and back of house employees, is an internal force 
associated with lower wage levels for back of house hotel employees.   
The proposal is to use a non-experimental associational design for each of the research 
questions. It is non-experimental because the independent variables cannot be manipulated and 
the interaction between variables is only being tested for one group (there is no control group). It 
is associational because the specific purpose of this design type is to explore relationships 
between variables (Gerring, 2012) This study uses cross-sectional data and is conducted at the 
meso-level with the unit of analysis being Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) for one set of 
hypotheses (due to a limitation of the data sets) and counties for another set of hypotheses.  




The concepts addressed in the study (i.e., tourism, natural amenities, self-enrichment, 
unionization, urban vs. rural, split-labor market, etc.) are operationalized in many cases by using 
established measurement scales or drawn from other studies. The partial replication of other 
studies and the use of existing measurement scales strengthens the internal and external validity 
of the measurements (Gerring, 2012). All variables, except for urbanization, are measured at the 
interval or ratio level, permitting more precise measurement and more options for advanced 
statistical techniques (Gerring, 2012). Urbanization is measured categorically due to the highly 
skewed nature of the data. The variables used in these hypotheses are fully described in Chapter 
3. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized in four chapters; Chapter 2 provides detailed 
background on the topic and a literature review, Chapter 3 outlines the research design and 
methods, Chapter 4 provides the findings, and Chapter 5 provides the conclusions. These 
chapters are followed by an appendix, bibliography, and my current Curriculum Vitae.  




Chapter 2: Background & Literature Review 
 
Urban and rural interest in tourism, from a local economic development perspective, gained 
traction in the early 1990s as town and country struggled to retain traditional employers. Cities 
worked diligently to renovate and convert spaces, once dedicated to production, and often in a 
state of decline, to areas which could support consumption by visitors (Judd & Fainstein, 1999). 
Upon completion of these new spaces, cities marketed them as commodities in hopes of drawing 
visitors, creating jobs, and producing new tax revenue (Fainstein & Gladstone, 1999).  Rural 
communities, instead of rebuilding town centers to create amenities for visitors, focused on 
commodifying natural amenities (Halseth et al., 2010; Hassebrook, 2003) or leveraging interest 
in tours of agri-business (e.g., wineries, farms and dairies) (Britton, 1991).   
Planning theorists noted at the time of the resurgence in tourism that there were several 
issues with the sector that should be addressed by public officials with new regulations. 
Destinations needed protection from environmental impacts, unwanted commercialization, and 
in some cases increased crime associated with visitors. Conversely, cities need to construct 
safeguards to protect visitors – which is a critical component for protecting the reputation of the 
destination. These safeguards, in turn,  can contribute to additional issues such as gentrification 
and spatial segregation (Hoffman et al., 2003). The burden for addressing issues of justice, 
however, such as low wages was left explicitly to labor organizations and community organizers 
(Judd & Fainstein, 1999).  
Twenty years removed from this call for regulatory controls, and with no substantial changes 
in the wages structure of the industry, Fainstein revisited the topic in The Just City (2010). Based 
on the significant public investment in tourism over the prior two decades, she heightened her 




call for regulating private investment in the industry through “injecting concerns of justice into 
policy making.” A critical part of this charge was for local planners to study the distribution of 
private economic benefits within the tourism industry (Fainstein, 2010, pp. 179–183). 
The task of identifying the private distribution of economic benefits in the tourism industry is 
complex.  The tourism industry is comprised of several sectors and subsectors classified under 
the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). For most of these subsectors, 
spending of residents and travelers must be divided to isolate tourism related activity.  The U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis performs this split at the National and State levels using guidelines 
promulgated by the United Nations. Table 2 provides this calculation of employment and 
spending activity for each of the subsectors associated with the tourism industry in the United 
States (Franks & Osborne, 2019).  
Table 2: Composition of the United States Tourism Industry, 2018 
Subsectors Employment (000’s) Visitor Spending (000’s) 
Hospitality (Hotels) 1,538 26.0% $191,786 18.1% 
Restaurants 1,665 28.1% $122,105 11.5% 
Air Transportation 582 9.82% $215,167 20.27% 
Car Rental 104 1.76% $36,634 3.45% 
Travel Reservations 199 3.36% $49,843 4.70% 




 326 5.25% $50,721 4.78% 
Recreation 575 9.7% $97,523 9.2% 
Shopping 505 8.5% $135,087 12.7% 
Other 242 4.1% $2,956 0.3% 
Total 5,925 100% $1,061,271 100% 
Source: Survey of Current Business, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (Franks & Osborne, 2019) 
The quantitative and qualitative research on tourism include several ways to measure the 
economic benefits of tourism for business owners, local communities, government agencies, 
family units, and individuals.  Some of these measures can be applied across the spectrum of 




subsectors which comprise the tourism industry (e.g., hospitality, restaurants, transportation, 
recreation, and shopping). However, to create a manageable scope for this dissertation, I limit the 
focus of much of the literature review to the accommodation subsector. The accommodation, or 
hospitality subsector is an appropriate segment on which to focus as hotels are the cornerstone of 
tourism industry, serving as the temporary residence for visitors – their home base for sight-
seeing excursions, shopping trips, dining out and attending shows and sporting events. Hotels, as 
opposed to Airbnb rentals, restaurants, museums, and other businesses which support tourism, 
are used exclusively by visitors and comprise one of the largest components of local spending by 
tourists (Guttentag, 2015; Measuring Employment in the Tourism Industries: Guide with Best 
Practices, 2014).   
The literature review which follows is divided into five sections. The first section reviews 
literature on the distribution of private economic benefits in the accommodation subsector.  The 
second section reviews literature specific to the wage structure of service sectors which comprise 
the tourism industry - and the external and internal forces associated with changes in wages. The 
third section reviews the distribution of the primary public economic benefit from hotel 
properties – transient occupancy taxes. It is in this section where a gap in the literature is 
identified, and one of the primary research questions is developed. The fourth section reviews the 
literature on the relationship between natural amenities and tourism. It is in this section where the 
other primary research question is developed.  The final section presents all the research 
questions to be studied, and the theoretical frameworks used to establish the direction of 
associations for the hypotheses. The chapter concludes with a set of hypotheses to carry forward 
into Chapter 3 (research design and methodology). 




How do you measure the distribution of economic benefits from tourism? 
Fainstein argues that understanding the distribution of economic benefits within the 
tourism industry is important for planners to inject matters of social equity into policymaking 
(Fainstein, 2010).  A rich source of information on the distribution of private economic benefits 
generated by hotels is the economic feasibility studies sponsored by local governments. These 
studies contain microsimulation models of hotel operations and are commissioned by local 
governments to study and promote the feasibility of constructing new hotels in their jurisdictions.    
The studies project the detailed revenues, expenditures, and net income of prospective hotels. In 
these line items, the distribution of private economic benefits is on full display. In some studies, 
the consulting analyst goes further and projects the wage structure within the prospective hotel 
and the local taxes that would be paid by hotel guests. Microsimulation models are gaining 
popularity in policy analysis (Figari et al., 2014), and these studies on individual hotels can serve 
as a basis to build models for planners to extrapolate to, and assess the distribution of economic 
benefits for, the entire hospitality subsector in their community.   
Example: Prospective Business Class Hotel  
A hotel feasibility study which provides a comprehensive projection of private and public 
economic benefits was conducted for a municipality outside Birmingham, Alabama by Interim 
Hospitality Consultants (IHC). The study is for a business class hotel (Hampton Inn and Suites 
by Hilton) of 70 rooms, approximating the national average of 71 rooms per hotel (Economic 
Survey, 2012).  Table 3 replicates a summary of projected annual revenues, profit by department, 
and expenditures presented in the hotel feasibility study.  





Table 3: Summary of Revenues and Expenditures for a Proposed Business Class Hotel 
Revenue 
    
Rooms 
   
 $        2,027,393  
Telecommunications (Complementary)  $                     -0- 
Retail Center 
   
 $              53,030  
Other Revenue 
   
 $              35,360  
Total Revenue 
   
 $        2,115,783  
Department Profit* 
    
Rooms 
   
 $        1,504,348  
Telecommunications 
  
 $            (30,852) 
Retail Center  
   
 $              26,444  
Other Hotel         $              17,630  
Total Dept./House Profit 
   
 $        1,517,570  
Deductions from Income 
    
Administrative & General 
 
 $            199,014  
Sales & Marketing 
   
 $              83,999  
Complimentary Guest Services 
 
 $              99,386  
Marketing fee (% of Room Rev) 
  
3.00%  $              60,822  
Franchise fee (%of Room Rev) 
  
6.00%  $            121,644  
Utilities  
   
 $            128,207  
Repairs & Maintenance     $              92,348  
Total Deductions from Income        $            785,419  
Gross Operating Profit 
(Department Profits less Deductions from Income)  
 $            732,151  
Management Fee        $              63,640  
Fixed Costs 
    
Real Estate Tax 
   
 $              50,000  
Insurance  
   
 $              25,000  
Replacement Reserves        $              21,210  
Total Fixed Cost & Management Fee  $            159,850  
Net Operating Income 
   
 $            572,301  
* Net revenue after deduction for expenses 
Data sources: Interim Hospitality Consultants 2011 (Schedule 1, page H-2)  
 
The purpose of Table 3 is to communicate to prospective investors the feasibility of a 
hotel development. Investors validate the accuracy of the individual line items and then focus on 
the Net Operating Income (NOI). The NOI is the annual cashflow received by the investor and it 




is used to calculate the prospective value of the hotel. This is the primary private economic 
benefit generated by a hotel, and the distribution of this benefit is made solely to investors. 
However, there are several other private economic benefits and recipients embedded in each of 
the line items listed above the NOI.  IHC provides additional schedules in their report which 
detail the beneficiaries of these expenditures. These expenses are secondary benefits and are 
typically used by economists and public policy makers to support development of hotel 
properties.  Neo-liberal economists, heterodox economists, sociologists and urban theorists view 
this, and other data associated with hotel operations, in different ways.  Neo-liberal economists, 
in general, favor pairing hotel revenue data with input-output (I/O) models to measure economic 
benefits while heterodox economists and others tend to focus on wage data and business-to-
business expenditures to measure economic sustainability.  
Measuring Economic Benefits with Input-Output Models 
The input-output models favored by neo-liberal economists are widely used by local 
governments to characterize the private economic benefits of tourism investments. These models 
are presented as economic impact assessments and focus on measuring consumer spending 
activity and how the injection of outside money into a local economy multiplies as spending 
flows from the tourist to business, from business to business, from business to employee wages, 
and then once again from employees spending their wages in the local service sector for 
groceries and other goods (Bess & Ambargis, 2011).  These assessments are promoted as useful 
tools to inform policy makers on the prioritization of public resources (Dwyer et al., 2010).   
Input-output models calculate economic impacts by applying multipliers to economic 
inputs to calculate economic outputs. Inputs vary across sectors, but for the tourism industry, 
visitor spending is typically used as the input. This includes visitor spending on hotels, 




transportation, meals, entertainment and shopping. The multiplier used to calculate outputs 
(indirect and induced spending) is ideally customized based on local wages, availability of 
tourism-related business to purchase goods locally (indirect impacts), and the opportunities for 
tourism employees to spend their earnings locally (induced impacts).  
  Input-out models can produce striking numbers and are routinely used to justify public 
investment in tourism.  However, there are critics, even among neo-liberal economists, of input-
output models. One of the primary criticisms is the limitations of the models to accurately 
capture benefits within a specified geographic boundary (State, region, city). Predicting where 
businesses and employees will spend income received from tourist activity requires detailed 
research specific to the subject location. Yet virtually all input-output models rely on generic 
composite multipliers. Another criticism is the inability of input-output models to capture the full 
range of costs and benefits associated with an infusion of tourist spending into a community. On 
the cost side, this includes the inability of the model to capture the costs to the public associated 
with adding low-wage employees into the local economy. On the benefit side, the model does 
not estimate the tax revenue brought into a community by tourists, compared to the cost to 
provide those visitors public services. Because of the significance of these and other limitations, 
some economists believe the input-output models are ineffective for measuring and evaluating 
the distribution of economic benefits to a specific geographic location.  As an alternative, Dwyer 
et al (2010) suggest public officials use community benefit assessments to measure a broad range 
of economic factors, including social and environmental impacts, to understand better the 
distribution of economic benefits within a defined geographic location (Dwyer et al., 2010).   




Measuring Economic Benefits through Community Benefit Assessments 
A community benefit assessment involves segregating expenditures between those likely 
associated with local business, and those associated with non-local entities. By organizing the 
expenditures this way, it is possible to isolate the economic benefits accruing to local businesses 
and residents, from those expenditures benefiting non-local entities. Table 4 presents how a 
community benefits assessment can be structured. Sixty-seven (67) line-items from the various 
department expense projections from the business class hotel model are summarized into 16 
categories for this table and placed into three groups (local benefit, external benefit, and 
unclassified). The local benefit category includes the portion of payroll supporting living wages1 
and expenses paid to local businesses or government agencies. Slightly more than a quarter of 
the hotel expenditures (27.5%) from the model provide local benefits. A majority of the 
expenditures (55.5%) are made outside the community and provide external benefits to other 
jurisdictions. The external benefits include investor returns and fees paid to franchisees 
(marketing, management, revenue sharing), items that can be purchased in bulk, payments to 
national service corporations, and business travel out of the area. The unclassified expenditures 
represent the segment of the payroll which provides employees with sub-living wages. It is 
undetermined how this segment of the payroll impacts the local community because it is 
unknown how the individuals make up the gap in their wages. Seventeen percent (17%) of hotel 
expenditures in the model are distributed to this unclassified segment. Appendix A provides 
additional details on the wage composition of the workforce in this model. 
  
 
1 The living wage is based on a single individual living alone as calculated by the MIT wage calculator.  





Table 4: Local and Non-Local Economic Beneficiaries 
Category Amount  
Annual Revenue  $        2,528,521   




  Living Wages A  $            305,623  
  Local Utilities  $            128,207   
  Local food purchases  $              52,889   
  Taxes and Licenses  $              52,000   
  Local services  $              46,830   
  Maintenance   $              44,510   
  Charitable contributions  $                3,600   
Subtotal: Local Benefit  $            633,659  25.1% 
External Benefit (Leakage) 
 
 
  Profit & Fees B  $            818,406   
  Bulk Supplies  $            143,737   
  Marketing & Travel  $              50,126   
  Service contracts  $              49,252   
  Credit Card Commissions  $              40,548   
  Insurance  $              25,000   
  Guest relations  $              12,682   
  Miscellaneous  $              35,872   
Subtotal: External Benefit  $        1,175,623  46.5% 
Unclassified C  $            359,275  14.2% 
A. Four full-time and one part-time staff 
B. Marketing, Franchise, Management fees 
C. Sub-living wage payroll 
Source data: Interim Hospitality Consultants 2011, Schedule 1, Page H-1  
 
  The local economic benefit of hotel spending in the IHC business class hotel model is 
$633,885.  It is worth noting here that an estimate of annual economic activity projected with  an 
input-output model, for this same group of expenditures, would be in the range of $4.0 million.2  
This illustrates the vast difference between local economic activity and all economic activity 
 
2 IHC consultants applied a multiplier of 1.94 to annual revenues on another hotel in the same geographical region to 
estimate economic activity from that hotel. 




generated by tourism expenditures, and why some discourage public officials from using input-
output models to support local public investment in tourism (Dwyer et al., 2010). 
Measuring Economic Benefits from a Sustainability Perspective 
 Heterodox economists and sociologists have developed additional ways to measure the 
distribution of economic activity within a community. These measures fall under the general 
concept of economically sustainable development. The importance of sustainable development, 
with both environmental and economic dimensions, emerged after a series of environmental 
disasters in the 1970’s, and following sixteen years of study by the United Nations. The concept 
was introduced in 1987 though the Brundtland Report  (Brundtland Report, Our Common 
Future, 1987, p. 41). The Commission defined the sustainable development this way,  
“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.  It contains 
within it two key concepts: the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the 
world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations 
imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to 
meet present and future needs.”  
Although the language in report does not provide operational definitions or measures for 
economic or environmental sustainability, subsequent studies by researchers and public 
organizations have suggested measures for these concepts. 
 Much of the work to define and measure sustainable economic activity comes from 
quantitative methods used to study international tourism development. This research includes 
efforts to measure local ownership, local business opportunities, and employee wage rates (Choi 




& Sirakaya, 2006; Franzoni, 2015; Garrigos-Simon et al., 2015). Professional organizations have 
also defined and developed quantitative measures for economic sustainability.  The United 
Nations Environment Programme and World Trade Organization published a policy guide 
specific to the tourism industry, with a stated goal to “ensure viable, long-term economic 
operations, providing socio-economic benefits to all stakeholders that are fairly distributed, 
including stable employment and income-earning opportunities and social services to host 
communities, and contributing to poverty alleviation (Making Tourism More Sustainable: A 
Guide for Policy Makers, 2005, p. 11).  The American Planning Association, whose guidance on 
sustainability primarily addresses non-economic issues, also issued guidelines for planners to 
favor local businesses over out-of-area corporations, and “encourage businesses that meet human 
needs fairly and efficiently (APA Policy Guide on Planning for Sustainability, 2000, p. 11; 
Godschalk & Rouse, 2015).   
 Table 5 provides several examples of quantitative measures of sustainable economic 
activity as identified by researchers and professional organizations.  
  




Table 5: Economic Sustainability Measures 
Category Measurements  Author 
Employee 
Wages 
Comparative ratio of new wages to local average wage Choi & Sirakaya 
Income per capita of the resident population Franzoni 
Average income of a worker in the tourism sector Franzoni 
Employment 
Rate 
Rate of employment (by sector) Franzoni 
Ratio of part time to full time employment in tourism Franzoni 
Local unemployment rate in low season Franzoni 
% of employment of the community in the last three years Franzoni 
Local 
Businesses 
Percent of income leakage from the community Garrigos-Simon  
Entrepreneurial opportunities for residents Garrigos-Simon et 
al, Choi & Sirakaya 
No. of tourism firms in the community Franzoni 
Longevity of tourism firms (rate of turnover) Franzoni 
Economic and social benefits (employment) United Nations 
Fulfill local employment and consumer needs without degrading the environment APA 
Promote financial and social equity in the workplace APA 
Income generated by the community Franzoni 
Taxes Local government revenue Choi & Sirakaya 
 Revenue from income tax Franzoni 
 Net tourism revenues accruing to the community Franzoni 
 Revenue from business permits and taxation Franzoni 
Land-use Measure effects on existing business United Nations 
 Utilization of existing business capacity United Nations 
 Utilization of existing buildings United Nations 
 Plans for after-use of sites. United Nations 
 % of increase/decrease in the prices of land  Franzoni 
 
Researchers have also used qualitative and mixed methods to explore dimensions of 
sustainable economic activity. This literature contains both discrete measures and general 
observations and tends to focus on how employment in the tourism sector impacts the well-being 
of individuals and their social network.  Case studies and ethnographies are common in these 
studies. One group of researchers evaluated life expectancy at birth and literacy rates in 
developing countries focused on tourism (Sanchez-Rivero et al., 2013). Another, studying 
tourism development on the coast of Belize, measured the importance of tourism income to 
family units, assessed how local elites shaped the economic benefits received by residents, and 




compared the number of residents self-employed in tourism related activities to those employed 
by outside corporation (Belsky, 1999). 
In summary, practitioners and academics are using a variety of methods and measures to 
capture the private economic benefits of tourism. While profit, or net operating income, is of 
primary concern to owners and investors, there are several other measures identified above 
which are useful to gather descriptive data for policy makers considering public investments to 
support the industry, or regulations to shape the distribution of economic benefits. Some of these 
measures (i.e., local business ownership and participation, seasonal employment, ratio of part-
time to full-time employment) are also valuable as independent variables to test forces which 
may change the distribution of economic benefits within the industry.   
What forces change the distribution of private economic benefits to improve wages?   
Fainstein and Harvey identified the need to address the distribution of economic benefits 
from tourism with the end to improve the wage structure in the industry (Fainstein, 2010; 
Harvey, 2012). Tourism is comprised of several service sectors, which collectively, are receiving 
significant attention by researchers concerned with living wages. The attention on service sector 
wages has been heightened in the past three decades as the American economy has shifted from a 
heavy manufacturing base to one consisting primarily of service sectors (Sherman, 2007; Stiglitz, 
2015). However, there is a split among economists on the need for policies to lift service sector 
wages.  In a survey of 166 U.S. based economists conducted by the University of New 
Hampshire, nearly three quarters of the respondents opposed raising the minimum wage to 
$15.00 per hours and approximately half want the federal minimum wage eliminated or kept at 
the same level. Support for raising the minimum wage falls roughly along political affiliation. A 




majority of respondents identifying as Republican or Independent support lowering or 
maintaining the current minimum wage, while a majority of those identifying as Democrat 
support raising the minimum wage to just above $10.00 (Fowler & Smith, 2015) .   
Public officials are also reticent to address raising wages. At the state level, twenty-six state 
legislatures have passed laws preempting local officials from even considering raising wages 
(Huizar & Lathrop, 2019).  In a survey of local officials engaged in economic development, 
addressing matters of income inequality is the least important motivator for guiding policies and 
program development (while promoting tourism was rated the second most important economic 
development activity) (Economic Development 2014 Survey Results, 2014). Three of the largest 
states for tourism, California, Florida and Virginia, while actively promoting business interests 
within the industry, are silent in their planning documents on the wage structure of those working 
in the industry.  
In Florida’s strategic plan for tourism, the stated goal is to maximize the economic impact of 
travel and tourism, with an objective to achieve $100 billion in tourism related spend by 2020 
(2020 Strategic Plan, 2015). In the Commonwealth of Virginia, the responsibility for promoting 
tourism falls to the Virginia Tourism Corporation (VTC). The corporation still operates under a 
vision plan adopted in 2002. The goal of the plan is to increase tourism market-share and annual 
visitor spending in Virginia, (Vision Plan for Virginia’s Tourism Industry, 2002). In California, 
tourism officials set three goals in their 2012 strategic plan: 1) Garner approval of a 2013 state-
wide referendum on rental car assessments, 2) elevate legislators’ perceptions of the importance 
of the industry, and 3) raise consumer perceptions of California and increase media chatter with 
positive press articles that mention California and the economic benefits of travel (Visit 
California’s Strategic Business Plan; 2011-2016, 2011). Strikingly, the missions, goals and 




objectives of all three states mention nothing of employee wages, even though the 
accommodation sector (i.e., resorts, hotels, motels) is nested within the lowest paying industry 
sector (accommodation and food services) in all three states (Table 6).  
Table 6: Median Wages for Accommodation and Food Sector 
Sector California Florida Virginia 
Utilities $78,871 $53,973 $62,177 
Professional, scientific, and technical services 65,591 48,115 80,199 
Management of companies and enterprises 65,267 51,416 70,188 
Public administration 61,441 45,624 71,295 
Information 60,746 41,863 56,351 
Finance and insurance 55,081 44,828 52,354 
Manufacturing 44,133 38,634 44,335 
Educational services 40,015 36,632 38,928 
Wholesale trade 39,287 38,948 42,899 
Real estate and rental and leasing 39,099 32,205 41,324 
Transportation and warehousing 38,322 36,642 40,617 
Health care and social assistance 36,951 32,407 33,895 
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 24,541 22,409 17,262 
Administrative and support and waste management services 23,708 22,705 26,444 
Retail trade 22,660 21,292 21,686 
Other services, except public administration 21,481 21,056 27,593 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining: 20,581 20,948 31,508 
Accommodation and food services 16,544 16,667 14,990 
Civilian employed population median wage $34,818 $30,415 $38,396 
Accommodation and food service: % of median wage 48% 55% 39% 
Data source: 2014 American Community Survey 
 
Researchers concerned with addressing the wage structure problem in the service sector 
focus on unions as an external force for change. There is ample evidence that collective 
bargaining, strengthened by union membership, produces wage increases for employees (Card, 
2001; Mishel & Walters, 2003; Vella & Verbeek, 1998). These wage benefits typically accrue to 
lower skill levels often associated with tourism subsectors (Card, 1996; Freeman, 1980, 1982). 
However, the wage benefits accruing to private sector union members has dropped significantly 




due to decreasing membership rates (Worker Voice in a Time of Rising Inequality, 2015). 
Initially, the primary force driving down membership was adoption of the Taft Act in 1947. 
More recently, declines in union membership are associated with the proliferation of State 
legislation making it more difficult to organize and sustain union memberships (Ellwood & Fine, 
1987). And today, many large private employers are adopting strong anti-organizing tactics to 
further suppress union membership (Bronfenbrenner, 2009).  
The federal inaction on increasing minimum wages and the private sector drive to 
suppress collective bargaining has spurred community activism, often in partnership with labor 
organizations, to promote local ordinances to raise wage levels (Levi et al., 2002; Reich et al., 
2014).  One of the first successful cities to adopt a series of local wage ordinances was the City-
County of San Francisco. Adopted in the early 1990’s, the city-county grounded their policies in 
research on New Jersey’s action to raise their state minimum wage. The New Jersey study 
surveyed 410 fast food restaurants in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania and compared 
employment growth between stores with a State-imposed wage increase (New Jersey) and those 
without (Eastern Pennsylvania).  That research found no measurable negative impact on 
employment in the New Jersey restaurants resulting from the wage increase (Card & Krueger, 
1994). An analysis of San Francisco’s wage ordinance, years after adoption, found similar results 
– that the ordinances did not impact business operations (Reich et al., 2014, pp. 312–313). 
Nevertheless, despite the early success of San Francisco and other cities adopting living wage 
policies, just over 140 local governments employ some form of living wage program today. This 
represents only a small fraction of the 25,000 local communities in the United States.  
Determinants of a successful local wage campaigns are varied, with most efforts 
succeeding in adopting some form of ordinance. Few campaigns fail. Some are derailed by State 




Legislatures or Courts (Adams & Neumark, 2005). In other cases, a lack of coordination with 
union organizations is cited as the reason for failure to win adoption (Luce, 2005). For those 
ordinances which have passed, troubles exist with effectiveness and execution. Effectiveness is 
hampered by limitations written into the language of the ordinances. Exclusions and phasing of 
wage increases limit effectiveness, and officials can undercut the ordinance through lax 
enforcement or liberal granting of waivers.  For these reasons, the benefits of adopting wage 
ordinances are not measured solely by researchers with improvements to wages, but to related 
improvements in union membership, contributions to national campaigns on wage issues, and 
strengthening local alliances working on other social equity issues  (Luce, 2012).  
In addition to research focused on external forces suppressing tourism wages, several 
qualitative researchers are studying internal forces within the industry which could influence 
wage outcomes. This research, conducted primarily by sociologists, recognizes a unique aspect 
of tourism employment. Some workers in the industry simultaneously produce a product and are 
the product. The social interaction between hotel management and front desk workers and their 
guests, or wait staff and restaurant customers is an important element measured and 
commodified by business owners (Britton, 1991; Sherman, 2007; Urry, 1990).  In contrast, 
workers in the back of house (housekeeping and maintenance staff) provide physical labor and 
are tasked with being invisible to guests (this invisible labor is usually comprised of immigrants 
and minorities). 
The tension between these two groups of laborers (front and back of house) was apparent 
to Rachel Sherman during her qualitative research, as she immersed herself into hotel operations. 
The front desk staff negotiated inequities with their guests by creating genuine relationships 
which bolstered self-respect, while back of house labor had no such outlet and felt the full brunt 




of the inequity (Sherman, 2007). This difference in the hospitality workforce, applying the split 
labor market theory of Edna Bonacich (Bonacich, 1972), could be an internal factor in 
suppressing the wages of back of house workers.  Additional discussion on the impact of split 
labor markets on wages is discussed below in the section on theoretical frameworks associated 
with the research questions.   
How are public economic benefits distributed? 
Taxes are the primary economic benefit of tourism to State and local governments. Hotel 
owners pay property taxes and their transient occupants also pay sales tax on local purchases – 
just like local residents. In addition, hotel occupants pay a transient occupancy tax based on their 
daily room rate which is not imposed on permanent residents. These taxes are applied by local 
and state governments. Some jurisdictions characterize the tax as a “sales” or “bed” tax. Since 
transient occupants of hotels require no more public services than permanent residents, the 
unique transient occupancy tax applied to hotel occupants is likely a source of profit for local and 
state governments. This conclusion is why some researchers promote tourism taxes as a source 
income which can be used to subsidize services to existing residents (Boley et al., 2014).   
Table 7 replicates the projected tax revenue schedule from the IHC Business Class Hotel 
Model (Interim Hospitality Consultants, 2013). The taxes collected exclusively on room revenue 
and overall revenue for the hotel are $434,870. This excludes property tax paid by the hotel 
($50,000 as identified in the supporting schedules) and any taxes paid by hotel guests at airports, 
renting cars, purchasing gasoline, shopping in stores, dining in restaurants, or attending cultural 
or sporting events. In this respect, the hotel tax revenue collected by local and state governments 




can be viewed as being more than what is necessary to provide public services to temporary 
residents. 
Hotel tax revenue, the primary public economic benefit, is similar in magnitude to the 
annual private profit (NOI) of $572,301 estimated for the hotel investors (see Table 3). This tax 
revenue is taken in by local and state governments, and then allocated to public purposes in the 
annual or biannual budget process. This public economic benefit has the potential to address 
concerns of social equity in the tourism sector. The use of the revenue, however, has not yet been 
addressed in the planning literature.    




Room Revenue  $2,032,950 
Total Revenue  $2,121,340 
Occupancy Tax on Hotel Revenue   
City of Montevallo 5% $101,650 
Shelby County 7% $142,310 
Sales Tax on Total Revenues   
City of Montevallo 4% $84,850 
Shelby County 1% $21,210 
State of Alabama 4% $84,850 
Total Taxes  $434,870 
Source: IHC Feasibility Study, Page H-10 
 
How do natural amenities influence tourism development and taxation? 
Fainstein and Harvey focus on the public investment in tourist attractions as justification to 
address wage inequities in the industry. However, there is some literature which indicates that 




natural amenities are an important element of tourism development – as well as a source of 
leverage for local government officials exploiting taxation powers.   
Much of the literature connecting natural amenities with tourism comes from rural studies. 
Rural communities, instead of building amenities for visitors, can focus on promoting natural 
amenities as attractions (Halseth et al., 2010; Hassebrook, 2003) or leveraging interest in tours of 
agri-business (e.g., wineries, farms and dairies) (Britton, 1991).  John Penders and his 
collaborators described this approach as “Amenity-Based Development.” They argue that “for 
places with significant natural (or cultural) amenities such as mountains, lakes, and beaches, it 
may be possible to increase local income and wealth, diversify the economy, and achieve more 
sustainable rural development through increased tourism, recreation, and retirement 
development” (Pender et al., 2012, p. 19). 
Marcouiller et al (2004) in their research found that natural amenities are positively 
associated with hotel activity. Their study used five separate scales to measure natural amenities 
using various recreational activities associated with land-based, river-based, lake-based, warm-
weather, and cold-weather environments.  Outcomes in tourism activity, as measured in three 
states (Wisconsin, Minnesota and Michigan) were tourism employment, the number of tourism 
firms, and retail service employment (Marcouiller et al., 2004). 
Public choice economists recognize that strong natural amenities create an environment 
which could lead to local government to leverage tax increases on residents. Brueckner and 
Neumark posit that “in locations with strong amenities, public sector workers may have more 
ability to extract rents [taxes], as these amenities drive wedges between the utility of taxpayers in 




different locations that public sector workers can exploit.” Their research confirmed this 
hypothesis (Brueckner & Neumark, 2014).  
Research Questions from the Literature Review 
Using micro-simulation models to understand the economics of the hospitality subsector 
responds in part to Fainstein’s charge to local government officials to provide the public with 
accurate information on the distribution of private economic benefits within the tourism sector. 
The models are instructive for assessing the economic benefits generated by hotel properties and 
for understanding the wage structure in the local hospitality market. The distribution of public 
economic benefits (hotel tax revenues) from the hospitality subsector, however, cannot be 
addressed with an economic model of hotel operations. To address this line of inquiry, patterns 
of public expenditures must be analyzed.  Given the magnitude of the public economic benefits 
potentially generated by the hospitality sector, and the lack of any research addressing this aspect 
of the industry, one of the primary research questions of this dissertation is, how are public 
economic benefits from the hospitality subsector being distributed? The other primary research 
question goes to the role of natural amenities in hotel development and is, are natural amenities 
an important element in the promotion and taxation of tourism? 
Other research questions in this dissertation seek to test suppositions or explore 
observations from the literature review relating to external and internal forces that impact wages. 
Here then, in Table 8 below, are the proposed research questions, the sourcing of each question, 
and where applicable, the theoretical framework which predict the direction of the hypotheses 
associated with the subject question (the hypotheses are detailed in Chapter 3). The rationale for 
choosing the theoretical frameworks follows the table below. 




Table 8: Research Questions, Sourcing and Theoretical Frameworks 
Research Questions Source Theoretical Framework 
1. How are the public economic benefits of 
the hospitality subsector distributed? 
Gap in the literature. Power to Tax Theory 
2. Are natural amenities an important 
element in the promotion and taxation of 
tourism? 
 
Gap in the literature 
  
Power to Tax Theory 
3.  Have unions improved the wage 
structure in their local hospitality 
subsector? 
Based on previous research findings.  Not applicable 
4.  Do differences in race between front of 
house and back of house employees in 
the hospitality subsector reduce the 
wages of back of house employees?  
Based on field observations of Rachel 
Sherman during her qualitative 
research of hotel operations, and the 
wage inequality research of Edna 
Bonacich.   
Wage Conflict: Split Labor 
Market theory 
 
Theoretical Frameworks to Predict Direction of Associations 
Power to Tax Theory:  Distribution of Public Economic Benefits  
 
Although there is a significant gap in the literature exploring the distribution of public 
economic benefits from the tourism industry, there are several economists who put forward 
theories or articulate principles which could predict the use of these benefits. I review these 
above in the introductory chapter. Of the options reviewed, the Power to Tax theory is selected to 
predict the direction of the hypotheses associated with the distribution of public economic 
benefits. Power to Tax theory, a product of public choice economics, suggests that public 
officials will use the public economic benefits to enrich themselves, by increasing the number 
and salaries of public employees. This theory is appropriate for this study for three reasons. First, 
recognizing and addressing the negative influence of bureaucrats pursing their own self-interests 
is supported in the public administration literature. H. George Frederickson, the first champion 
for social equity in public administration, suggest identifying and rooting out self-interests in 




order to preserve credibility for government institutions (Frederickson, 1991). Second, 
expenditures on local government employees (average salaries and total payroll) are measured 
annually by the U.S. Government and therefore can be operationalized more accurately than 
other potential uses (benevolent expenditures, spending on tourism promotion and marketing, 
living wages, or employee profit sharing). And finally, recent studies by public choice 
economists have tested the Power to Tax theory using government employee compensation as an 
outcome variable (Brueckner & Neumark, 2014; Diamond, 2017). This dissertation can benefit 
from these past efforts, and contribute to future research, through use of standardized variables 
operationalizing government compensation (Gerring, 2012).  
The previous Power to Tax-based studies by Brueckner, Neumark and Diamond posit that 
certain conditions inhibit residents from migrating, or “voting with their feet,” in the face of 
higher taxes. Charles Tiebout first advanced the proposition that residents controlled the level of 
taxation in their community with the ability to migrate to another location (Tiebout, 1956). The 
mobility inhibitors tested in these previous studies were natural amenities (Brueckner & 
Neumark, 2014) and homogeneity in regional housing prices (Diamond, 2017). Brueckner and 
Neumark posited that “in locations with strong amenities, public sector workers may have more 
ability to extract rents [taxes], as these amenities drive wedges between the utility of taxpayers in 
different locations that public sector workers can exploit” (Brueckner & Neumark, 2014). Local 
amenities included mild climate, dry weather, proximity to coastal areas, and population density. 
Diamond hypothesized that governments presiding over jurisdictions with less elastic housing 
supplies (no option to move to nearby lower cost areas) are able to raise taxes without providing 
taxpayers additional government services (Diamond, 2017). These studies, using Power to Tax 
theory as a framework, posited that the higher tax revenues imposed on residents with limited 




mobility would in turn be used by local government officials to inflate their own salaries or 
increase their numbers (the dependent variable in the studies). Government self-enrichment was 
operationalized in these studies as local government wages per capita (Diamond, 2017) and the 
differential between public and private sector wages (Brueckner & Neumark, 2014) with 
counties or Metropolitan Statistical Areas serving as the unit of analysis. Cost of living variations 
between communities was controlled using housing prices. Diamond’s findings on the 
relationship between limitations on the mobility of residents and higher local government wages 
per capita were statistically significant with a one (1) standard deviation increase in an MSA’s 
land unavailability increasing government payrolls per county resident by 5.2 percent, 
government full-time equivalents per county resident by 1.5 percent, and average government 
worker wages by 3.7 percent.  
 One of the primary purposes of this dissertation proposal is to study the distribution of 
public economic benefits from tourism. The presumption, based on Power to Tax theory, is that 
public officials will use hotel tax revenues generated by tourism for self-enrichment. If the 
findings are consistent with the Power to Tax theory, they will clarify, at least in part, how the 
public economic benefits of tourism are being distributed. If this study determines that 
government officials are using tourism development as a mechanism to distribute public 
economic benefits for self-enrichment, the findings will become a significant element in the 
policy debate on social equity within the industry. This type of finding would be of interest to 
tourism employees, unions, and social equity advocates. 
Wage Conflict Theory: Wage Suppression in Back-of-House Occupations:  
 
Rachel Sherman, in her qualitative study of hotel operations, observed tension between 
front-of-house (managers, front-desk) and back-of-house (housekeeping) employees. Sherman’s 




observations, in part, alluded to differences in race and nationality between these two groups 
(Sherman, 2007). It is proposed to explore the implications of this observation by assessing any 
wage differential between supervisors and employees in the housekeeping classification, based 
on the racial disparity of these two groups. Although Sherman did not reference this in her study, 
wage conflict theory suggests there would be a negative impact on wages for housekeeping 
employees as the racial disparity between supervisors and employees increases. Due to 
limitations in the availability of wage data by classification and industry, this analysis will 
encompass housekeepers and housekeeper supervisors in all industry sectors. The 
accommodation subsector is the largest user of the housekeeping classification (49%) and the 
second largest user of the supervisor classification (21%) (Table 9).   
Table 9: Distribution of Housekeeping Occupation Classifications by Industry 
2016 Industry Employment Housekeepers Housekeeping Supervisors 
Number Percent Number Percent 
Traveler Accommodation 452,620 49% 33,390 21% 
Services to Buildings and 
Dwellings 
115,040 12% 53,060 33% 
General Medical and 
Surgical Hospitals 
102,560 11% 7,320 5% 
Nursing Care Facilities 69,330 7% 6,030 4% 
All other subsectors 185,090 20% 61,340 38% 
Total Employment 924,640 100% 161,140 100% 
 
Wage conflict theories are rooted in the works of Karl Marx. One of his theories states 
the power of capital, controlled by the elite (bourgeois), over labor (the proletariat) is exercised 
through means of production, with the objective being the exploitation of workers and 
suppression of wages (Marx, 1867). Edna Bonacich’s split labor market theory is a variation of 
wage conflict theory which addresses race and ethnicity. In this theory, labor is divided into two 
groups based on the willingness to accept lower pay for the same job. The group willing to 




accept the lower pay is typically the ethnic or racial group marginalized by groups in power. The 
split between marginalized wage earners, dominant wage earners, and businesses creates a three-
class system. The business wants to suppress all workers, the dominant wage earners want to 
protect their premium wage, and the low-wage earners want to hold on to their job. This theory 
suggests racial or ethnic tension between the two classes of wage earners as the business works 
against both groups to suppress each of their wages (Bonacich, 1972).   
  




Chapter 3: Research Design, Methods & Data Preparation 
 
Consistent with past studies that are being partially replicated here, the research questions 
in this study will be addressed with a non-experimental associational design. It is non-
experimental because the independent variables cannot be manipulated and the interaction 
between variables is only being tested for one group (there is no control group). It is 
associational because the specific purpose of this design type is to explore relationships between 
variables (Gerring, 2012).  This study uses cross-sectional data collected at a single point in time. 
A single cross section is used, in part, due to the use of mediated linear regression to answer, in 
part, the primary research question. The study is conducted at the meso-level with the unit of 
measure being MSAs for some (based on the limitation of unionization data), and the 
geographical boundaries of counties for others (consistent with previous studies). The variables 
of interest are operationalized, where possible, based on approaches used in previous studies to 
bolster internal validity. The research design is depicted by the symbols:  
N   O 
The single row indicates there is only one group in the study. The “N” indicates the cases 
in the single group (MSAs/counties) will be selected naturally. The single O” indicates data was 
collected at a single point in time.  
Table 10 provides a summary of the research questions, the testable hypothesis proposed 
to answer each question, and notes on the direction of association. Following this table, detailed 
information is provided on datasets, operational definitions for each variable, and diagrams 
illustrating the proposed statistical tests.  





Table 10: Overview of Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 Research Question Hypotheses Notes 
1. How are the public economic 
benefits of the hospitality 
subsector distributed? 
H1: Counties with higher levels of per capita hotel 





H1 is the primary focus of 
this study. The direction of 
association is based on 




2. Are natural amenities an 
important element in the 
promotion and taxation of 
tourism?  
H2: Counties with higher scores on the USDA Natural 
Amenities Scale will have higher per capita hotel 
revenue. 
 
H3: Counties with higher scores on the USDA 
Natural Amenities Scale will have higher levels of 
per capita local government wages. 
H4: County scores on the USDA Natural Amenities 
Scale will not influence per capita local government 
wages independent of its effect on per capita hotel 
revenue (conditioned on confirmation of preceding 
hypotheses). 
 
H5: Rural counties with higher levels of per capita 
hotel revenue will have higher levels of per capita 
local government wages than urban counties. 
H2 and H3 replicate previous 
studies and comprise two 
paths (H1 is the third) of a 





H4 tests whether a previously 
established association (H3) 
is mediated by per capita 
hotel revenue.    
 
 
The direction of association 
is based on Power to Tax 
Theory. Rural governments 
can direct more tax revenue 
for self-enrichment because 
they do not have to build 
attractions. 
3.  Have unions improved the 
wage structure in their local 
hospitality subsector? 
H6: MSA’s with higher levels of union membership 
will have higher levels of accommodation subsector 
wages. 
The direction of association 
is based on previous 
literature cited in Chapter 2. 
4..  Do differences in race 
between front of house and 
back of house employees in 
the hospitality subsector 
suppress the wages of back of 
house employees?  
H7: MSA’s with a higher differential in racial 
composition between housekeeping supervisors and 
housekeeping employees will have lower 
housekeeping wages. 
  
The direction of association 




Research Hypotheses (H1 – H7) 
There are seven research hypotheses associated with the four research questions. Each 
hypothesis is presented below and followed with a diagram illustrating the relationships being 
tested.  




Hypothesis 1 addresses the first research question; 1) How are the public economic 
benefits of the hospitality subsector distributed? Based on power to tax theory, the hypothesis 
posits that public hospitality subsector benefits, as measured by per capita hotel revenue (a proxy 
for local hotel taxes), is positively associated with higher per capita local government wages 
(Figure 3): 
H1: Counties with higher levels of per capita hotel revenue will have higher levels of 
per capita local government wages 
The second, third, fourth and fifth research hypotheses for this study are associated with 
the second question; 2) Are natural amenities an important element in the promotion and 
exploitation of tourism? Hypothesis 2 partially replicates a previous study and tests the direct 
association between natural amenities and tourism. Hypothesis 3 also partially replicates a 
previous Power to Tax based study which tests the association between natural amenities and 
local government wages. The fourth hypothesis combines the first three hypotheses to assess, 
through mediated linear regression, whether per capita hotel revenue is the mechanism which 
links the association between natural amenities and higher per capita local public wages. The 
conceptual diagram for this analysis is depicted in Figure 2. Hypothesis 2 is the first path in this 
mediation model (path a) and is predicted based on the previous research of Marcouiller et al 
(2004) and posits that natural amenities are positively associated with hotel revenues.  
H2: Counties with higher scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will have 
higher per capita hotel revenue. 
The second path in this mediation model (path b) is the test of Hypothesis 1 (from above) 
with a predicted positive relationship between hotel wages per capita and per capita local 
government wages.  




Hypothesis 3 is the third path in this mediation model (path c) and is predicted based on 
the previous research of Brueckner and Neumark (2014) and posits that natural amenities are 
positively associated with per capita local government wages:  
H3: Counties with higher scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will have 
higher levels of per capita local government wages. 
 The fourth path in this mediation model (path ab) tests whether or not hotel revenue is the 
mechanism that mediates the relationship between natural amenities and higher per capita local 
government wages. Since high levels of natural amenities are a logical antecedent to tourism 
development, and tax revenues from tourism (hotels, retail sales, car rentals, etc.) are necessary 
to boost local government salaries, the hypothesis is that tourism activity (as measured by hotel 
revenue) will be the mechanism that mediates the relationship between natural amenities and 
higher per capita local government wages:  
H4: County scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will not influence per capita 
local government wages independent of its effect on hotel revenue per capita.3 
This hypothesis will be tested using mediated linear regression (PROCESS Model 4) 
(Hayes, 2018, p. 585).  
 
 
3 The language used in this hypothesis is modeled after language from Andrew Hayes’ Introduction to Mediation, 
Moderation and Conditional Process Analysis (Hayes, 2018, p. 518).  




Figure 2: Conceptual Diagram of Statistical Test for Hypotheses #1 - #4 
 
 
Hypothesis 5 also addresses the second research question. The literature suggests that 
rural areas require less public investment in built amenities to attract tourists. Rural areas can 
rely on existing natural amenities and agritourism to draw in tourists. This reliance on existing 
assets could permit local government officials to direct more public economic benefits, based on 
Power to Tax theory, towards their own self-enrichment.   
H5: There will be a stronger positive relationship between per capita hotel revenue and 
per capita local government wages in Mostly Rural and Rural counties as compared to Mostly 
Urban counties. 
 




Figure 3: Conceptual Diagram of Statistical Test (with split file) for Hypothesis #5 
 
 
Hypothesis 6 addresses part of the third research question; Have unions improved the 
wage structure in their local hospitality subsector? This hypothesis explores the supposition by 
Fainstein that unions can have a positive impact on wages in the tourism sector (Figure 4).  
H6: MSA’s with higher levels of union membership will have higher levels of 
accommodation subsector wages. 
Figure 4: Conceptual Diagram of Statistical Test for Hypothesis #6  
 
The seventh hypothesis, using wage conflict theory, addresses internal forces affecting 
the wages of a classification popular in the hospitality subsector: housekeepers and maids. It 
answers the question: Do differences in race between housekeeping supervisors and 
housekeepers suppress the wages of housekeepers? This hypothesis predicts that, based on split-




labor market theory, wages of housekeepers will be lower when there is a greater differential in 
race between housekeeping supervisors and housekeepers (Figure 5).  
H7: Counties with a higher differential in racial composition between housekeeping 
supervisors and housekeeping employees will have lower housekeeping wages. 
 




Operational Definitions and Data Sets for Variables of Interest  
As they appear in order above, below is an explanation of how each variable in this study is 
operationalized.   
Per Capita Hotel Revenue (proxy for hotel taxes):  Marcouiller et al (2004) in their study 
of tourism activity in three states (Wisconsin, Minnesota and Michigan) operationalized tourism 
activity using tourism employment, the number of tourism firms, and retail service employment. 
The challenge with these measurements of tourism activity is that they are not easily replicated 
for the national scope of this study. The tourism “industry” is not a defined industry sector in the 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).  Tourism-related economic activity is 
spread across multiple subsectors in the NAICS system – most of which serve both tourists and 
local residents. This process of splitting activities between tourists and local residents introduces 




potential reliability and validity concerns. The only subsector that is allocated entirely (100%) to 
the tourism industry is the accommodation subsector (i.e., hotels, resorts, bed and breakfast).  
Therefore, for this study, operationalization of tourism activity will focus on data collected from 
the accommodation subsector. 
Data on employment, payroll, and revenue for the accommodation subsector is collected 
by the U.S. Government at the local government level. Of these three data elements, hotel 
revenue is the best fit for this study. Hotel revenue is a good fit since it is used by local 
governments to assess (collect) local occupancy taxes. The Economic Census provides hotel 
revenue data. The Economic Census is the major source of facts about the structure and 
functioning of the United States economy. The producers of this data set, the United States 
Census Bureau, state that “The local governments use the data to assess business activities and 
tax bases within their jurisdictions, as well as to develop programs to attract business,” and that 
trade associations use the data to “study trends in their own and competing industries, which 
allows them to keep their members informed of market changes” (Economic Survey, 2012). Data 
from the 2012 Economic Census will be used in this study. The revenue will be divided by the 
2012 county populations to produce hotel revenue per capita. 
Hotel revenue estimates are available for 1,813 counties or county equivalents through 
the Economic Census.  The availability of hotel revenue data is limited by non-responses to data 
requests (215 non-responsive counties) and privacy concerns (1,114 counties). Privacy concerns 
exist where there are a limited number of hotels in a county, and release of the revenue data 
would permit users to associate revenue with specific hotels (“Economic Census: Reliability of 
Data,” 2019).  This dataset, therefore, is potentially a limiting factor for the number of counties 
which can be studied. Estimating processes to replace missing data are detailed below.  




Per Capita Local Government Wages (proxy for local government self-enrichment): 
Diamond operationalized local government self-enrichment using per capita payrolls for local 
governments. This study uses a similar measurement. Local government payrolls (NAICS code 
92/Type 3) for each county are derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of 
Employment Wages (Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 2014). The annual payrolls 
for 2014 are used for each county. This allows for a two-year lag, as suggested by Warner 
(Warner, 2013), for the local government to collect and allocate (through the budget process) 
hotel revenue for potential self-enrichment. This data was then transformed into a per capita 
basis using 2014 population data from the American Community Survey. 
Median Gross Rent (Control Variable):  To address a competing explanation for high local 
government wages, the local cost of living (using housing cost as a proxy) is used as a control 
variable. This is consistent with similar research conducted by Diamond (2017) and Brueckner et 
al (2014). Monthly median gross housing rent (Table B25064 of the ACS) serves as a proxy for 
cost of living.  The presumption here is with a higher the cost of living (using gross rent as a 
proxy), local governments will have to offer higher salaries to recruit and retain employees. 
Housing costs were also used as the control variable in the Brueckner and Neumark study 
(Brueckner & Neumark, 2014). 
USDA Natural Amenities Scale: Natural amenities were operationalized by Brueckner and 
Neumark with four individual scales: mild weather, dry weather, proximity to a major body of 
water, and population density (Brueckner & Neumark, 2014). Marcouiller et al (2014) use five 
separate scales to measure natural amenities using various recreational activities associated with 
land-based, river-based, lake-based, warm-weather, and cold-weather environments. For this 
study a single standardized scale, which incorporates elements from both Brueckner and 




Marcouiller, will be used to operationalize natural amenities – the Natural Amenities Scale 
produced by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service.  
The USDA describes their Natural Amenities Scale as: 
  “a measure of the physical characteristics of a county area that enhance the location as a 
place to live. The scale was constructed by combining six measures of climate, 
topography, and water area that reflect environmental qualities most people prefer. These 
measures are warm winter, winter sun, temperate summer, low summer humidity, 
topographic variation, and water area (Natural Amenities Scale, 2018).”  
The USDA provides data for counties or county equivalents in the lower 48 States. Counties 
in Hawaii and Alaska are excluded, so the available cases are 3,111. The USDA cites the 
unavailability of data as the reason for excluding Hawaii and Alaska from their dataset. For the 
continental U.S. The dataset contains the original measures and standardized scores for each 
county.  The level of analysis for the scale is interval, with scores ranging from a high of 11.17 
(Ventura County, CA) to a low of -6.4 (Red Lake County, MN) (Natural Amenities Scale, 2018). 
The scale has been used in previous studies testing migration patterns of people between 
geographic regions in the United States  (Hunter et al., 2005; Nelson, 2006). 
Union Membership: The percentage of union membership at the state and metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) in both the public and private sector is collected by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  Barry Hirsch of Georgia State University and David Macpherson of Trinity University 
organize this data for researchers and make it available on the web at unionstats.gsu.edu.  
Hotel Employee Wages:  The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides wages by 
employee classification. Narrowing the focus to just front-line employees, the subject of this 




study, comes with some limitations. Data on wages for front-line classifications (i.e., front desk 
clerk, housekeeper) is only available by industry at the State level. However, some classifications 
are highly concentrated in certain industries. For example, 94% of the hotel desk clerk positions 
nationally are in the accommodation subsector. Furthermore, the mean wages of hotel desk 
clerks in the accommodation subsector are within .02% of the average of hotel desk clerks from 
all industries (as measured at the State level). Therefore, the hotel desk clerk wages were 
selected at the Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Area level for all industries and used as 
a proxy for front-line wages in the accommodation subsector. The 2016 wage data for hotel desk 
clerks (Classification 43-4081) was obtained from the Occupational Employment Statistics 
(OES) Survey conducted by the BLS.  This permits a two year period between the independent 
(union participation) and dependent variable (hotel desk clerk wages) per the recommendation of 
Warner (Warner, 2013). 
Difference in racial composition between housekeeping supervisors and housekeeping 
workforce:  This will be measured by the difference between the percentage of white   
housekeeping supervisors (Occupation Code 37-1011) and white housekeeping employees 
(Occupation Code 37-2012).  This data is drawn from a unique component of the 2010 American 
Community Survey and is sponsored by four Federal agencies: 1) the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, 2) the Employment Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division at 
the Department of Justice, 3) the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs at the 
Department of Labor, and 3) the Office of Personnel Management. Although racial composition 
of classifications is available at the industry subsector level with the 2010 data set, the wages for 
these classifications are not available by industry. Therefore, the racial disparity will be 
calculated across all industries for the subject classifications. The accommodation subsector is 




the largest user of the housekeeping classification and the second largest user of the 
housekeeping supervisor classification (Table 9). There is no known literature in which this 
theory (split labor market) is operationalized. 
2010 Housekeeping wages:   The 2010 wage data for housekeeping and maids 
(Classification 37--2012) was obtained from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) 
Survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  The wages represent the average 
across all industries – consistent with the make-up of the independent variable (racial disparity 
between housekeeping supervisors and employees). 
Urban-Rural Split: There are several ways to split geographical designations into either 
urban or rural classifications. All classifications start with census data on population density and 
land coverage collected at the finest geographical area – the census tract (i.e., blocks). Census 
tracts are defined as urban if the population density is more than 1,000 residents per square mile.  
Adjustments are made to this threshold if there are large public spaces in the census tract (i.e., 
parks, airports, cemeteries). Any census tract not defined as urban is by default rural. One option 
to classifying the urban or rural character of counties involves calculating the percentage a 
population living in either an urban or rural census tract within the county. Using this approach, 
the Census Bureau has established three ways to define counties: Mostly urban, mostly rural, and 
completely rural (Ratcliffe et al., 2016). These are the three categories of “urban” and “rural” 
which will be used in this study. 
  





A summary of all variables and sources is provided in Table 11. 
Table 11: Data Sources for Variables 
Role Variable Level of Measurement 
& Unit of Analysis 
Source Year 
Association of Natural Amenities & Hotel Revenue with Higher Local Government Wages 
Y: Dependent Local Government 
Salaries Per Capita 
Ratio/County Bureau of Labor Statistics: 
NAICS 92 (Local only) 
American Community 
Survey 2014 Population 
2014 
X: Independent & 
M: Mediator 
Hotel Revenue Per Capita Ratio/County 2012 Economic Census: 
NAICS 721 
American Community 
Survey 2012 Population 
2012 
X: Independent Natural Amenities Scale Interval/County United States Department of 
Agriculture 
2010 
X: Independent Rural Classification Categorical/County United States Department of 
Agriculture 
2010 
Control Housing Cost (Median 
Gross Rent) 
Ratio/County American Community 
Survey 5-year estimates 
2010-2014; Table B25064 
2014 
Association of Unionization with Tourism Wages 
Y: Dependent  Hotel Clerk Wages Ratio/MSA Occupational Employment 
Statistics Survey, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
2016 
X: Independent Unionization Ratio/MSA Unionstats.gsu.edu 
(compilation of Bureau of 
Labor data) 
2014 
Control Housing Cost (Median 
Gross Rents) 
Ratio/MSA American Community 
Survey 5-year estimates 
2012-2016; Table B25064 
2014 
Association of Racial Disparity in Workforce and Housekeeping Wages 
Y: Dependent Housekeeping Employee 
wages 
Ratio/MSA Occupational Employment 
Statistics Survey, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
2010 









Control Housing Cost (Median 
Gross Rents) 
Ratio/MSA American Community 
Survey 5-year estimates 
2006-2010; Table B25064 
2010 
 




Data Analysis Techniques 
All hypotheses, except Hypothesis 4, will be tested with linear regression using IBM’s 
SPSS software (Version 26). Hypothesis 4 will be tested using the PROCESS module (model 4) 
for SPSS developed by Andrew Hayes (Hayes, 2018). This module permits the testing of a 
mediated linear regression model in a single analysis.   
Hypothesis 5 uses the same data sets as Hypothesis 1, expect that data will be split into 
mostly urban, mostly rural and rural categories. The differences between the tests for each group 
will be compared.   
Validity, Reliability and Limitations 
The research design is non-experimental/associational using cross-sectional data. Non-
experimental designs, while very common in the literature, are problematic because of a lack of a 
comparator group and an intervention (Gorard, 2013) – neither of which can be introduced into 
this study. The limitation of this design is mitigated by careful construction and alignment of the 
design and methods. 
The proposed research design and methods were carefully constructed, framed in existing 
theory, and rooted in existing literature to minimize bias (de Vaus, 2001; Gorard, 2013; Shadish 
et al., 2002).  The research design and methods align the problem statement, theoretical 
framework, research questions, testable hypotheses, operationalized variables of interest, data 
collection and statistical analysis.  The problem identified is the inequitable distribution of 
economic benefits from tourism. The gap in the literature which is addressed in the research 
design is clarifying the public sector’s distribution of economic benefits from tourism. The 
theoretical framework selected to explore this gap is Power to Tax theory, which predicts that 




public officials will use public economic benefits from tourism (taxes) to enrich their own 
numbers and compensation. One of the testable hypotheses that follows posits, in general terms, 
that higher levels of hotel revenue in a county (a proxy for hotel tax revenue accruing to the 
county) will be associated with higher expenditures on local government salaries.  
The concepts addressed in the study (i.e., tourism, self-enrichment, etc.) are 
operationalized in many cases by using established measurement scales or drawn from other 
studies which are partially replicated. The partial replication of other studies and the use of 
existing measurement scales strengthens the internal and external validity of the measurements, 
and the use of established secondary data sets also strengthens the reliability of the 
measurements. All variables are measured at the interval or ratio level, permitting more precise 
measurement and more options for advanced statistical techniques (Gerring, 2012). There is no 
logical or theoretical basis for testing reciprocal associations between the key variables.  
There are reliability concerns with the dataset used for hotel revenue and union 
membership. The technical notes for the 2012 Economic Census, the source of hotel revenue, 
indicates the presence of non-sampling errors and a significant percentage of the values are 
imputed. Revenue data was collected from 2,927 of the potential 3,143 counties and county 
equivalents. However, due to privacy concerns, data for 1,114 of these counties is masked, 
leaving only 1,813 cases (counties) with actual revenue data. Furthermore, of the cases with 
accessible data, 34 have an imputation rate above 50%, 115 cases have imputation rates between 
25% and 50%, and 352 cases have imputation rates between 10% and 25% (Economic Census: 
Reliability of Data, 2019). Despite these weaknesses, the Economic Census is widely regarded as 
the best business census in the world (Boettcher & Gaines, 2004) . 




The unionization data is presented at the MSA level (n=264) based on the disaggregation 
of BLS data by Hirsch and Macpherson (Hirsch & Macpherson, 2019). The BLS does not 
disaggregate the data due to concerns about sample size. Using BLS data only would limit 
analysis to unionization data aggregated at the state level (n=50).  The smaller population of BLS 
data, and the heterogeneity of data likely coming from larger states, is viewed as a greater 
limitation than the sample size concerns with the larger MSA data set prepared by Hirsch and 
Macpherson.  
Assessment of Findings 
Using power to tax theory as a theoretical framework, the primary purpose of this study is to 
study the relationship between natural amenities, tourism (using hotel revenues as a proxy) and 
higher local government employee salaries. Previous research has studied the association of 
natural amenities and tourism, and natural amenities and higher local government employee 
salaries. The relationship between natural amenities and tourism was established also using 
different data sets than in this study.  The relationship between hotel revenues and higher local 
government employee wages, and potentially, the mediating influence of hotel revenues between 
natural amenities and higher wages will be tested in this study and address a gap in the literature. 
If research hypotheses 1 and 4 are validated, the findings will provide additional support for the 
Power to Tax theory and clarify, at least in part, how the public economic benefits of tourism are 
being derived and distributed.   
The answer to these research questions could provide the necessary context to address some 
of the problems identified by Fainstein and Harvey on the allocation of benefits in the tourism 
industry. The answers may also reveal, as Power to Tax theory suggests, that solving the wage 




problem in the tourism industry may not simply involve unions negotiating with the private 
sector, but rather, there could be a significant opportunity for advocates to challenge the 
allocation of excess tax revenues by local governments.  These findings would be of interest to 
tourism employees, unions, and social equity advocates. Conversely, if there is no connection 
between tourism and public employee wages, the findings will challenge support for the Power 
to Tax theory. 
Data Preparation: H1 through H5 
The following sections detail the data preparation for each of the hypotheses. The data 
cleaning process applied to all data is outlined in Appendix B. The process is based on 
recommendations in Tabachnick & Fidell for ungrouped data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The 
format of this section includes a numerical/alphabetical sequence to permit easier tracking of the 
steps taken in the data preparation process. There are four sections for each hypothesis. Section 1 
covers the univariate screening for each variable. The variables are further itemized by lower 
case letters (i.e., a, b, c, etc.). Section 2 covers the bivariate screening. Section 3 includes the 
multivariate screening and finally Section 4 provides a summary of missing data and limitations. 
Appendix C provides graphs and tables used during the data screening process.  
1. Data Acquisition and Univariate Screening 
a. Dependent Variable: Local Government Wages per Capita (H1 and H3) 
Local government wages per capita for 2014 is a computed variable which takes total 
local government wages for a county divided by the population for the county. The data source 
for local government wages is the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the source for population is the 
Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (5 year).  There are 3,143 counties in the United 
States. There was one case (Bedford City, VA) missing data for population. The 2012 population 




for this case was used to replace the missing data. There were 337 cases missing data for local 
government wages. To estimate values for missing local government wages, wage data between 
the years 2010 and 2015 were reviewed to identify values from which to extrapolate a 2014 
estimate. For example, if there was data available in 2013 and 2015 for the case, the value for 
2014 was computed by taking the average of 2013 and 2015. Using this approach, 148 values 
were estimated for cases with missing data. After this process there were 189 cases (6.0%) 
remaining with missing values. The two values were then combined by dividing local 
government wages with population to compute a local government wages per capita variable. 
There were 2,954 cases out of a possible 3,143 to continue with the screening process.  
Z scores were prepared for all cases. There were 34 cases with Z scores above 3.3. These 
cases were evaluated for input errors and extreme outliers. Finding none, all 2,954 cases were 
analyzed for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: 4.05) and visual 
inspection of a histogram revealed a strong positive skewness to the data. The common log of the 
data was calculated to transform the data to a near-normal distribution (skewness:.808). Graphs 
and tables associated with this review and transformation are available in the appendix (Figures 
C-1 and C-2, Table C-1). 
b. Independent/Dependent/Mediating Variable: Hotel Revenue per Capita (H1, H2 & 
H4) 
Hotel revenue per capita for 2012 is a computed value which takes hotel revenue in a 
county divided by the population of the county. Hotel revenue data comes from the Economic 
Survey data set collected by the Census Bureau and population data comes from the American 
Community Survey. About 44%, or 1,330 of the 3,143 counties are missing hotel revenue data in 
the 2012 Economic Survey is missing – either supressed for confidentialy purposes or non-




reported. There are1113 counties without data due to confidentiality concerns and 217 counties 
due to non-responses to the survey.   
A two-step process was used to estimate suppressed or missing data. First, hotel 
employment was estimated for each case using data from the County Business Patterns data set. 
This data is collected annually and provides a range of employees for cases with suppressed data. 
This estimating process involved solving for the difference between actual state totals (every 
state has an actual employment total) and actual county data and then allocating the difference 
among the counties with missing data. The second step was to multiply the mean revenue per 
employee from actual data ($74,847 in hotel revenue/per employee) with the estimated employee 
total to produce a replacement revenue value. One thousand one hundred and eleven (1,111) 
cases were populated with estimated values through this process. Employees are a valid 
component of this estimating process because there is high correlation between hotel employees 
and hotel revenue among actual data (ρ .989, see Table C-2). Estimating employees using ranges 
provided in the County Business Patterns to address missing data is a common practice  
(Isserman & Westervelt, 2006).  
Z scores were prepared for all cases. There were 24 cases with Z scores above 3.3. These 
were reviewed for input errors and extreme outliers. Finding none, all 2,926 cases were analyzed 
for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness:23.40) and visual inspection of a 
histogram revealed a strong positive skewness to the data. The common log (Log 10) of the data 
was calculated to transform the data to a near-normal distribution (skewness: .349).  Graphs and 
tables with data associated with this review and transformation are available in the appendix 
(Figures C-3 and C-4, Table C-3). 




c. Independent Variable: Natural Amenities Scale (H2, H3 and H4) 
The Natural Amenities Scale dataset was acquired from a webpage maintained by the 
United States Department of Agriculture. The data was downloaded in the form of an Excel 
spreadsheet. The data included raw data and Z-scores for six components of the scale: January 
temperature, January sunshine, June Temperature, June humidity, topography, and percentage of 
water coverage. The scale is based on the sum of these six Z-scores.  There were 35 cases with 
missing data. Alaska (29), Hawaii (5), and Colorado (Broomfield County) were missing data. 
The values for a city within Broomfield County were used to replace the missing data for that 
county.  The USDA did not include Alaska and Hawaii in their scale citing the unavailability of 
data for counties in those two states. Values for these states were not estimated.  
Z scores were calculated for the Natural Amenities Scale. Twenty-two cases (22) were 
over 3.3 standard deviations from the mean in either direction. These were reviewed for input 
errors and extreme outliers. Finding none, all 3,108 cases were analyzed for normality of 
distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: .951) and visual inspection of a histogram (Figure 
C-5) revealed a near normal distribution, so no transformation was necessary.  
d. Split-file Categorical Variable: Urban-Rural Classifications (H5) 
Rural classification data was acquired from U.S. Census Bureau. This data is contained in 
an Excel spreadsheet and provides the percent of population in each county (from 0% to 100%) 
that is designated as rural. The data is based on 2010 populations. The data also places each 
county in one of three categories: Mostly Urban, Mostly Rural, and Rural. Mostly Urban 
counties are less than 50% rural, Mostly Rural counties are more than 50% rural, but not 100% 
rural and Rural counties are those with 100% of the population being rural. There were two 
counties missing data. Based on population, these were placed in the Rural category. No 




percentage was assigned to these counties. The breakdown between classification is Mostly 
Urban: 1,253, Mostly Rural: 1,185, and Rural: 704.   
e. Control Variable: Median Gross Rent (H1, H3, and H4) 
Median Gross Rents for all counties for 2014 from the American Community Survey 
(Table ID B25064) was downloaded via the Census Bureau website. The data was downloaded 
in an Excel spreadsheet, which in turn was imported into SPSS. There were 3,143 cases within 
the United States. No missing values were identified.   
Z scores were prepared for all cases. There were 45 cases with Z scores above 3.3. These 
were cases reviewed for errors and extreme outliers. Finding none, all 3,143 cases were analyzed 
for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: 1.70) and visual inspection of a 
histogram revealed a strong positive skewness to the data. The Log 10 of the data was calculated 
to transform the data to a near-normal distribution (skewness: .703). See Figure C-6, Table C-4 
and Figure C-7 for more details.  
2. Bivariate Screening of County-based Variables 
Scatter plots were prepared with: 
a) Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) and Log (Local Government Wages per 
Capita) (Figure C-8), 
b) Natural Amenities and Log (Local Government Wages Per Capita) (Figure C-
9), 
c)  Natural Amenities and Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) (Figure C-10), and 




d) Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) and Log (Median Gross Rent) 
(Figure C-11).  
Based on visual inspection of these scatterplots, twelve (12) outliers were removed from 
further analysis (Table C-5). 
3. Multivariate Screening for County-based Variables 
H1: Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of Log (Hotel Revenue 
per Capita) to predict Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) after controlling for the 
influence of cost of living [Log (Median Gross rent)].  A preliminary regression analysis was 
conducted to identify multivariate outliers. Five cases which exceeded a Mahalanobis value of 
16.23 were removed from the final analysis.  
H2: A preliminary regression analysis was conducted to identify multivariate outliers. 
Four (4) cases which exceed the Mahalanobis cutoff value of 13.82 were removed from the final 
analysis. 
H3: A preliminary regression analysis was conducted to identify multivariate outliers. 
Twenty-four (24) cases which exceed the Mahalanobis cutoff value of 16.23 were removed from 
the final analysis. 
H4: This hypothesis is tested with a statistical model (PROCESS Model 4) which does 
not employ multivariate outlier screening.   
H5: This hypothesis tests Hypothesis 1 with a split file based on urban-rural categories. 
All multivariate outliers from Hypothesis #1 were removed prior to the final statistical analysis.  
 




4. Summary of Missing Data & Limitations 
After replacing missing data for most cases, there remains 186 cases (6%) missing data 
for Local Government Wages per Capita, 217 cases (7%) missing Hotel Revenue per Capita, 33 
cases (1.1%) missing data for Natural Amenities, and no cases missing Median Gross Rent. 
Little’s MCAR test was conducted, and it was determined that the missing data was not random 
(p<.000). As previously states, the missing Natural Amenities data was from Hawaii and Alaska. 
The counties missing Hotel Revenue per Capita data average approximately 7,000 in population, 
while counties with data average approximately 100,000. Likewise, counties missing Local 
Government Wages per Capita data tend to have smaller populations than counties with data. 
The average population of counties missing wage data is approximately 50,000, while counties 
with data have populations averaging approximately 100,000. Based on the distribution of 
missing data, the findings in this study are generally applicable to larger cities within the 
continental United States. 
Data Preparation: H6 
1. Data Acquisition and Univariate Screening  
a. Dependent Variable: Hotel Desk Clerk Wages 
 
The 2016 wage data for hotel desk clerks (Classification 43-4081) was obtained from the 
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) Survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS). The data comes from BLS in an Excel spreadsheet and then was imported into SPSS. 
There are 369 Metropolitan Statistical Areas with data (out of 381) for Desk Clerk wages. Only 
six (6) of the 552 Micropolitan Statistical Areas had wage data. There is no estimating process 
available to replace missing data for Micropolitan Areas, so these cases are trimmed from the 
dataset to focus further analysis on Metropolitan Statistical Areas.  




Z scores were prepared for all cases. There were 5 cases with Z scores above 3.3. These 
were cases assessed for accuracy and extreme outliers. All were accurate, but two wages 
(Kahului-Wailuku-Lahaina and Urban Honolulu, HI) were over 6 Standard Deviations from the 
mean. These extreme outliers were filtered out of further analysis. The remaining 367 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas were analyzed for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics 
(skewness: 1.43) and visual inspection of a histogram revealed a small positive skewness to the 
data. The Square root and Log 10 of the data was calculated to assess the potential improvement 
in the distribution of the data. These transformations did not substantially improve the 
distribution (SQRT skewness: 1.207, Log 10 Skewness:.999), so no changes were made to the 
variable.  See figures C-12 and C-13.  
b. Independent Variable: Private Union Membership 
Union density data was obtained from unionstats.com by downloading an excel 
spreadsheet with 2016 MSA data. This data was imported into SPSS and analyzed for missing 
data. There are 260 MSA’s with data for private union membership rates. No method was 
identified to estimate missing data for the 121 MSAs missing data. To assess the nature of the 
missing data, the MSAs were divided into three equally sized groups (127 each) by population. 
There was one case missing data for the 127 in the top group (0.8%), twenty-six (26) cases 
missing data for the 127 in the middle group (20.5%), and ninety four (94) cases missing data for 
the 127 cases in the lowest group (76%). To reduce the non-randomness of the missing data, the 
thirty-three (33) cases with data in the bottom third were removed, leaving 254 cases (211 with 
Union Membership Data) for study in high and middle population groups. These represent MSAs 
with a population over 160,000.  




The remaining 211 Metropolitan Statistical Areas with Private Union Membership Data 
were analyzed for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: 2.004) and visual 
inspection of a histogram revealed a strong positive skewness to the data. The Log 10 of the data 
was calculated to assess the potential improvement in the distribution of the data. This 
transformation reduced the improve the distribution (Log 10 Skewness: -352), so the data was 
transformed with a Log 10. See Figures C-14 and C-15. 
c. Control Variable: Median Gross Rent 
Median Gross Rents for all MSAs for 2016 from the American Community Survey 
(Table ID B25064) was downloaded via the Census Bureau website. The data was downloaded 
in an Excel spreadsheet, which in turn was imported into SPSS. There was rent data for all 211 
cases with union participation data (the dependent variable).  
Z scores were prepared for all cases. There were 5 cases with Z scores above 3.3. These 
were assessed for errors and extreme outliers. Finding none, no cases were filtered out based on 
this review. All cases were analyzed for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics 
(skewness: 1.60) and visual inspection of a histogram revealed a positive skewness to the data. 
The data was transformed using the square root and log 10 of the data to produce a more normal 
distribution. The square root produced a skewness of 1.26 and the log 10 produced a skewness of 
.906. The log 10 of the data was selected for use in the statistical analysis (see Figures C-16 and 
C-17 for histograms of Median Gross Rent and Log (Median Gross Rent).    
2. Bivariate Screening of MSA-based Variables 
A scatter plot with Log (Hotel Desk Clerk Wages) and Log (Private Union Membership)) 
was prepared to identify bivariate outliers. The relationship between the variables was linear and 




there were no extreme outliers based on visual inspection of the scatterplot (Figure C-18). A 
scatter plot with Log (Hotel Desk Clerk Wages) and Log (Median Gross Rent) was also prepared 
to identify bivariate outliers. The relationship between the variables was linear and no outliers 
were identified with visual inspection. (Figure C-19).  
3. Multivariate Screening 
A preliminary regression analysis was conducted to identify multivariate outliers. No 
cases exceeded a Mahalanobis value of 16.23, so no cases were removed from the final analysis. 
4. Summary of Missing Data & Limitations 
Union density data was the limiting factor among the three variables tested in this 
hypothesis. There was union membership data for 260 of the 369 MSAs with wage data (from a 
total population of 381 MSAs). The most missing data was from the less populated MSAs. 
Seventy-six (76) percent of the bottom third of MSAs, by population, were missing data. To 
reduce the non-randomness of the missing data, the thirty-three (33) cases with data in the 
bottom third were removed, leaving 211 MSAs with Union Membership Data) for study in high 
and middle population groups. These represent MSAs with a population over 160,000. 
Data Preparation: H7 
1. Data Acquisition and Univariate Screening  
a. Dependent Variable: Housekeeping Wages  
The 2010 wage data for hotel desk clerks (Classification 37-2012) was obtained from the 
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) Survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS). The data comes from BLS in an Excel spreadsheet and then was imported into SPSS.  




There are 359 Metropolitan Statistical Areas with data (out of 381) for Housekeeping 
wages (94.2%). Z scores were prepared for all cases. There were 3 cases with Z scores above 3.3. 
Finding no errors or extreme outliers in this group, all Metropolitan Statistical Areas were 
analyzed for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: 1.55) and visual 
inspection of a histogram revealed a small positive skewness to the data (Figure C-20). The Log 
10 of the data was calculated to assess the potential improvement in the distribution of the data. 
This transformation improved the distribution (Log 10 Skewness: 1.13), so the Log 10 
transformation was used for further analysis (Table C-6, Figure C-21).  
b. Independent Variable: Racial Disparity between Housekeeping Supervisors and 
Housekeeping Employees 
 
The racial composition of housekeeping supervisors (representing front-of-house 
employees) and housekeepers (representing back-of-house employees) is available in the 2010 
Equal Employment Opportunity Survey. The data for each classification was acquired by MSA 
from the Census Bureau website (EEO_10_5YR_EEOALL1W_Data). The category selected to 
define the racial composition of the two classifications was the number of employees designated 
as “Not Hispanic or Latino, one race - White alone; Total, both sexes.”  This data was imported 
into SPSS, where values were computed for percent of white housekeeping supervisors and 
percent of white housekeepers, and the gap between these two values. There were 354 MSAs 
with gap data. No method was identified to replace missing data with estimates. Z scores were 
prepared for all cases. There was 1 case with a Z score above 3.3. This single case was an 
extreme outlier (4.92 SD) and removed from further analysis. The remaining 353 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas were analyzed for normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: -




.306) and visual inspection of a histogram revealed a near normal distribution (Figure C-22). No 
transformation was performed.  
c. Control Variable: Median Gross Rent 
 
Median Gross Rents for all MSAs for 2010 from the American Community Survey 
(Table ID B25064) were downloaded via the Census Bureau website. The data was downloaded 
in an Excel spreadsheet, which in turn was imported into SPSS. There was no missing data.    
Z scores were prepared for all 354 cases with data for the dependent variable (racial 
disparity). There were 4 cases with Z scores above 3.3. There were no input errors or extreme 
outliers in this group. Therefore, Median Gross Rent for all 354 cases were analyzed for 
normality of distribution. Descriptive statistics (skewness: 1.32) and visual inspection of a 
histogram revealed a moderate positive skewness to the data (Figure C-23). The Log 10 of the 
data was calculated to transform the data to a near-normal distribution (skewness: .762) (Table 
C-7, Figure C-24).  
2. Bivariate Screening 
A scatter plot with Racial Disparity (X) and Log (Housekeeping Wages) (Y) was 
prepared to identify bivariate outliers. There were seven extreme outliers based on visual 
inspection of the scatterplot. These outliers were removed prior to the statistical analysis (Figure 
C-25) 
A scatter plot with Log (Housekeeping Wages) (Y) and Log (Median Gross Rent) was 
prepared to identify bivariate outliers. There were no outliers based on visual inspection of the 
scatterplot (Figure C-26).  




3. Multivariate Screening  
A preliminary regression analysis was conducted to identify multivariate outliers. No 
cases exceeded a Mahalanobis value of 16.23, so no cases were removed from the final analysis. 
4. Summary of Missing Data & Limitations 
There are 359 Metropolitan Statistical Areas with data (out of 381) for Housekeeping 
wages (94.2%). There were 357 MSAs with gap data. No method was identified to replace 
missing data with estimates. 
  




Chapter 4: Statistical Analysis and Findings 
 
This study is focused on identifying potential forces associated with the wage problem in 
the hospitality industry. The primary thesis, using Power to Tax theory as a theoretical 
framework, is that local government officials are using the public economic benefits from 
tourism to boost their own compensation and numbers. Several additional hypotheses are 
presented which go beyond the primary thesis to explore dimensions of the wage problem in the 
industry. Due to limitations in datasets, there are two types of cases for the hypotheses; Counties 
are used in Hypotheses 1-5, and Metropolitan Statistical Areas are used in Hypotheses 6 and 7. 
Statistical information is presented in text and tables as recommended by Nicol and Pexman for 
linear regression (Nicol & Pexman, 2010) and Hayes for mediated linear regression (Hayes, 
2018). 
Overview of Findings 
For the primary focus of this study, a significant relationship was found between hotel 
revenue and local government wages. The effect of this relationship was large, based on 
definitions set forth by Cohen (Warner, 2013, p. 208), with hotel revenue accounting for over 
11% of the change in local government wages per capita (H1) after controlling for cost of living. 
Other notable findings include a determination that natural amenities do not have a significant 
effect on local government wages independent of its effect through hotel revenue (H4), and a 
significant and large effect of union density (H6) on wages in the accommodation subsector for 
MSAs with populations over 160,000. Finally, there was a significant and medium effect of the 
racial disparity between supervisors and front-line housekeepers and the wages of front-line 
housekeepers (H7). This last finding has limitations due to the alignment of the supervisor -




employee classifications across the accommodation subsector. The findings provide support for 
the Power to Tax theory (H1) and are consistent with Split labor market Theory (H7).  
 
Table 12: Overview of Findings 




H1. Hotel Revenue (X) and Local 
Government Wages (Y) 
Positive Yes Yes 
H2. Natural Amenities (X) and Hotel 
Revenue (Y) 
Positive Yes Yes 
H3. Natural Amenities (X) and Local 
Government Wages (Y) 
Positive Yes Yes 
H4. Hotel Revenue (M) mediating 
relationship between Natural Amenities 
(X) and Local Government Wages (Y) 
Positive Yes Yes 
H5. Rurality, Hotel Revenue (X) and Local 
Government Wages (Y) 
Positive No No 
H6. Union Density (X) and Hotel Wages 
(Y) 
Positive Yes Yes 
H7. Race Disparity between Housekeeping 
Supervisors and Employees (X) and 
Wages of Housekeeping Employees (Y) 
Negative Yes Yes (with Limitations) 
 
Below are the statistical analyses and detailed findings for each hypothesis.  
H1: Counties with higher levels of per capita hotel revenue will have higher levels of per 
capita local government wages 
For the final analysis, Log (Median Gross Rent) was entered as Step 1, explaining 1.5% 
of the variance in Log (Local Government Wages per Capita). After entry of Log (Hotel 
Revenue per Capita) at Step 2 the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 12.4%, F 
(2, 2758) =194.57, p < .001. The predictor variable explained an additional 10.9% of the 
variance in Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) after controlling for cost of living, R 
squared change = .109, F change (1,2758) = 341.68, p < .001.  In the final model, only the 




predictor variable [(Log10 (Hotel Revenue per Capita Log)] was statistically significant and no 
issues with multicollinearity between variables were identified:  
 
These findings permit rejection of the null hypothesis and validate the subject alternative 
hypothesis (H1).  
Table 13: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) predicting Log 














.097 .005 .346*** .124*** .109*** 
 *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05   
 
After converting the log transformation of the variables, it can be stated that for every ten 
percent increase in hotel revenue per capita, local government wages per capita increases by 
1.0%.  This finding is consistent with Power to Tax theory which posits that public officials are 
rational actors who will bend public policy (i.e., taxation, spending) towards their self-interests.  
Log (Local Government Wages Per Capita) = 
2.95 + .026 x Median Gross Rent + .097 x Log (Hotel Revenue Per Capita) 
 




H2: Counties with higher scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will have higher per 
capita hotel revenue 
Simple linear regression was used to assess the ability of natural amenities to predict Log 
(hotel revenue per capita). The final regression model explains 7.8% of the variance (R2) and was 
significant, F (1,2868) = 243.25, p <.001. It was found that natural amenities significantly, with a 
medium to large effect, predicted hotel activity (β1= .265, p < .001). No issues with 
multicollinearity between variables were identified in the final analysis. 
The final model was:  
 
 
These findings permit rejection of the null hypothesis and validate the subject alternative 
hypothesis (H2).  
After exponentiating the common log coefficient (.07), two counties that differ by one 
unit on the Natural Amenities Scale are estimated to differ by 7.25% in Hotel Revenue per 
Capita. The Natural Amenities Scale ranges from a low of -6.4 to a high of 11.17 for a range of 
17.57. This validates previous research which found an association between natural amenities 
and tourism development and serves as a foundation for Hypothesis #4 – which tests whether 
hotel revenue per capita is a causal link between natural amenities and local government wages 
per capita.  
Practitioners in both the planning and public finance disciplines should consider how the 
source of tourism tax revenues should reshape local economic development initiatives targeted at 
Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) = 2.28 + .07 x Natural Amenities 




the low-wage tourism sector. Taxes derived from a common resource may deserve special 
consideration in how they are used to further public policy goals. This is especially relevant 
when the revenues, as the literature suggests, far exceed the cost of public service associated 
with the activity which is taxed.  
H3: Counties with higher scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will have higher 
levels of per capita local government wages 
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of Natural Amenities to 
predict Log (Local government wages per capita), after controlling for the influence of cost of 
living [Log (Median Gross Rent)].   
The Log (Median Gross Rent) was entered as Step 1, explaining 0.9% of the variance in 
Log (Local Government Wages per Capita). After entry of Natural Amenities at Step 2 the total 
variance explained by the model as a whole was 1.1%, F (2, 2888) = 16.186, p < .001. The 
predictor variable explained an additional .2% (small effect) of the variance in Log (Local 
Government Wages per Capita) after controlling for cost of living, R squared change = .2, F 
change (1, 2888) = 6.04, p = .014. In the final model the control variable [Log (Median Gross 
Rent)] scored a higher beta value (beta = .08, p = .001)) than Log (Local Government Wages) 
(beta = .048, p = .014). No issues with multicollinearity between variables were identified in the 
preliminary analysis:  
 
 
Log (Local Government Wages Per Capita) = 
2.88 + .128 x Log (Median Gross Rent) + .004 x Natural Amenities 




These findings permit rejection of the null hypothesis and validate the subject alternative 
hypothesis (H2).  
Table 14: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Natural Amenities predicting Log (Local Government 
Wages) (N = 2,828) 
Step and Predictor 
Variable 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1: 
Median Gross Rent 
(Log) 
.153 .030 .095*** .009*** -- 
Step 2: 
Natural Amenities 
.004 .001 .048* .011* .002* 
 *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05   
 
After exponentiating the common log coefficient (.004), two counties that differ by one 
unit on the Natural Amenities Scale are estimated to differ by 0.4% in Local Government Wages 
per Capita. The Natural Amenities Scale ranges from a low of -6.4 to a high of 11.17 for a range 
of 17.57 units. This finding corroborates previous research by public choice economists testing 
Power to Tax theory. Those researchers paired Power to Tax theory with Charles Tiebout’s 
proposition that residents controlled the level of taxation in their community by voting with their 
feet. Brueckner and Neumark tested natural amenities as an inhibitor to Tiebout’s proposition, 
while Diamond tested the homogeneity of housing prices as the inhibitor. These economists 
tested the association between residents with limited mobility and higher local government 
spending on public salaries (the dependent variable in the studies). In this respect, the findings in 
this dissertation are confirmatory and do not contribute anything new to the literature. 




H4: County scores on the USDA Natural Amenities Scale will not influence per capita local 
government wages independent of its effect on hotel revenue per capita  
A list-wise mediated linear regression was conducted to assess whether Log (Hotel 
Revenue per Capita) mediated the relationship between Natural Amenities and Log (Local 
Government Wages per Capita). The number of cases tested in the model with the list-wise 
condition was 2,712. Since there are fewer cases tested in this combined model, the results 
associated with the previous three hypotheses differ slightly.   
From a simple mediation analysis conducted using an ordinary least squares path 
analysis, the findings are that Natural Amenities indirectly influenced Log (Local Government 
Wages per Capita) through its effect on Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita). As illustrated below in 
Figure 6 and Table 18, the level of Natural Amenities in a county was associated with the 
amount of Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) in that county (a: .055 ) and levels of Log (Hotel 
Revenue per Capita) in a county were associated with the Log (Local Government Wages per 
Capita)  (b: .0978).  A bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect of Natural Amenities 
on Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) (ab = .0054) based on 5,000 bootstrap samples 
was entirely above zero (.0043 to .0066).  
There was no evidence that natural amenities influenced Log (Local Wages per Capita) 
independent of its effect on Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) (c’: -.0020, p = .14).  




Figure 6: Simple Mediation Model Results for H4 
 
Table 15 Results of Simple Mediation Model for H4 (N=2,712) 
  Consequent 
  M: Log (Hotel Revenue Per Capita)  Y: Log (Loc. Govt. Wages Per Capita) 
Antecedent  B SE p  B SE p 
X: Natural Amenities a .0554 .0048 .0000 c’ -.0020 .0014 .1413 
M: Log (Hotel Rev 
Per Cap) 
 –– –– –– b .0978 .0054 .0000 
C2 : Log (Median 
Gross Rent) 
f2 1.2203 .1083 .0000 g2 -.0034 .0309 .9121 
Constant im -1.1802 .3065 .0001 iy 3.0296 .0858 .0000 
  R2 = .1224  R2 = .1181 
  F (2,2709) = 188.88, p = .0000  F (3, 2708) = 120.86, p = .0000 
 
After converting the common log values4 of hotel revenue per capita and local 
government wages per capita to their original values, the findings can be stated as follows: 
 
4 See Appendix E for details on process used to convert log values. 




Path b:  For every ten percent increase in hotel revenue per capita, local government 
wages per capita increase by just under 1% (0.94%). This is a large effect (R2=.1181) and 
statistically significant (p = <.001). 
Path a: Two counties that differ by one unit on the Natural Amenities Scale are 
estimated to differ by 5.7% in Hotel Revenue per Capita. The Natural Amenities Scale 
range is 17.57 units (-6.4 to 11.17). This is a large effect (R2 .1224) and statistically 
significant (p = < .001). 
Path c: Two counties that differ by one unit on the Natural Amenities Scale are estimated 
to differ by 0.34% in Local Government Wages per Capita. This direct path is statistically 
significant (p = .0175). However, as part of the mediation model (path c’), the coefficient 
is negative (-.002) and not statistically significant (p = .1413). This change indicates there 
was no evidence that Natural Amenities influenced Local Wages per Capita independent 
of its effect on Hotel Revenue per Capita). 
Path ab (Hypothesis 4): Two counties that differ by one unit on the Natural Amenities 
Scale will differ by 0.54% in Local Government Wages per Capita. This finding is 
statistically significant as a bootstrap confidence interval for this indirect effect, based on 
5,000 bootstrap samples, was entirely above zero (.0043 to .0066). Since this range of 
coefficients do not include zero, the null hypothesis can be rejected, and the alternative 
hypothesis is confirmed.  
The finding for path ab, which indicate pathway from natural amenities to hotel revenue 
per capita to local government wages per capita, validate previous research which found an 
association between natural amenities and tourism development, but challenge previous research 




finding a direct association between natural amenities and local government wages per capita. 
The findings for path ab suggest there is not a direct association between natural amenities and 
local government wages per capita independent of the pathway through hotel revenue per capita. 
This finding provides important foundational information for drawing conclusions relative to the 
wage structure problem in the tourism industry. Since the findings indicates that tourism 
monetizes natural amenities, and in turn, local governments use this value to boost their own 
wage structure, it suggests that solving the wage structure problem in the tourism industry may 
be rooted in how local planning and public finance practitioners view and treat the origins of 
tourism taxes. Do they consider the tax revenue as a public economic benefit derived from local 
natural amenities, is it a product of private enterprise, or does the origin of this revenue not 
matter and the revenue simply gets lost as it is blended with other tax revenues during the 
budgeting process?  
H5: There will be a stronger positive relationship between per capita hotel revenue and per 
capita local government wages in Mostly Rural and Rural counties as compared to Mostly 
Urban counties 
After removing the same multivariate outliers from Hypothesis 1, the data for 
independent, dependent and control variables were split into three groups: Mostly Urban, Mostly 
Rural, and Rural.  This test is conducted to assess whether local governments in rural counties 
extract more of their wages from hotel taxes than urbanized counties. The premise being that 
rural counties can spend less on built amenities to attract visitors, and therefore can extract more 
hotel tax revenue for wages. As with Hypothesis 1, hierarchical regression was used to assess the 
ability of Log (Hotel Revenue Per Capita) to predict Log (Local Government Wages Per Capita) 
– by counties designated rural, mostly rural and mostly urban. Table 16 provides a recap of the 




findings by urban-rural classification. The findings indicate the association between Log (Hotel 
Revenue per Capita) and Log (local government wages per capita) does not change materially 
across urban-rural classifications – with R2 change ranging from 8.5% to 11.4%. 
Table 16: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) and Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) by Rural Classification 
Step and Variable B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
      
All Counties  











Step 2: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) .095 .005 .321*** .114*** .106*** 
Rural Counties (n=489) 











Step 2: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) .112 .014 .355*** .114*** .096*** 
Mostly Rural Counties (n=1105) 











Step 2: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) .082 008 .303*** .085*** .091*** 
Mostly Urban Counties (n=1168) 
Step 1: Log (Median Gross Rent) 
.133 .038 .102*** .010 -- 
Step 2: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) .085 .008 .308*** .090*** .093*** 
 *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05   
 
H6: MSA’s with higher levels of union membership will have higher levels of 
accommodation subsector wages 
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of Log (Private Union 
Membership) to predict Log (Hotel Desk Clerk Wages), after controlling for the influence of cost 
of living [Log (Median Gross Rent)].  For the final analysis, The Log (Median Gross Rent) was 
entered as Step 1, explaining of 54.7% of the variance in Log (Hotel Desk Clerk Wages). After 




entry of Log (Private Union Membership) at Step 2 the total variance explained by the model as 
a whole was 62.9%, F (2, 203) = 171.86, p < .001. The predictor variable explained an additional 
8.0% of the variance in Log (hotel desk clerk wages), after controlling for cost of living, R 
squared change = .08, F change (1, 203) = 43.65, p < .001. In the final model, both the control 
and predictor variables were statistically significant with the control variable [Log (Median 
Gross Rent)] scoring a higher beta value (beta = .721, p = < .001)) than Log (Private Union 
Membership Log) (beta = ..283, p = < .001);  
 
Table 17: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Private Union Membership Predicting Hotel Desk Clerk 
Wages 
Step and Predictor Variable 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1: Log (Median Gross Rent) .464 .029 .741*** .549*** -- 
 
Step 2: Log (Private Union 
Membership  
.044 .007 .283*** .629*** .08*** 
 
 *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05   
 
After converting the common log, it can be stated that for every 25% percent increase in 
private union membership, hotel clerk wages increase by 1%. 
 
 
Log (Hotel Desk Clerk Wages) = 
-.335 + .451 x Log (Median Gross Rent) + .044 x Log (Private Union Membership) 
 




H7: Counties with a higher differential in racial composition between housekeeping 
supervisors and housekeeping employees will have lower housekeeping wages 
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of the racial disparity 
between supervisors and front-line employees to predict the employee wages, after controlling 
for the influence of cost of living [(Log (Median Gross Rent)]. The Log (Median Gross Rent) 
was entered as Step 1, explaining 23.2% of the variance in employee wages. After entry of the 
racial disparity between employee groups at Step 2, the total variance explained by the model 
increased to 26.6%, F (2, 346) = 66.46, p < .001. The predictor variable (racial disparity) 
explained an additional 3.3% variance (medium effect) in employee wages, after controlling for 
cost of living, R squared change = .033, F change (1, 347) = 15.78, <.001. In the final model, 
both predictor variables were statistically significant with the Log (Median Gross Rent) variable 
recording a higher beta value (.533, p<.001) than the Racial Disparity variable (-.187, p<.001). 
 
Table 18: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Racial Disparity between Supervisors and Employees 
predicting Minority Wages 
Step and Predictor Variable B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1: (Log) Median Gross Rent  .338 .062 -.522*** .232*** -- 
Step 2: Racial Gap .000 .000 -.187*** .266*** .033*** 
 *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05   
 
Log (Housekeeping Wages) =  
.291 + .24 x Log (Median Gross Rent) + .0 x Racial Disparity 
 




The results indicate that for one standard deviation change in the racial gap between 
supervisors and workers, there is a negative one standard deviation change in wages. There are 
significant limitations with these findings, as the data for occupations (housekeeping supervisors 
and housekeepers) can only be separated by industry at the State level. Therefore, the county 








Chapter 5: Discussion 
This dissertation explores a unique dimension to the wage problem in the tourism 
industry by addressing the distribution of public economic benefits from the industry. The 
analyses focus on the cornerstone of the industry - the hospitality subsector. The primary 
findings indicate that local government employees are directing some tax revenue from hotel 
activity to boost their own numbers and compensation. Furthermore, the findings, corroborated 
in part by previous studies, indicate local government employees are commodifying the natural 
amenities in their communities through hotel taxes.  Taken together, the findings reveal a conduit 
by which local government employees first commodify natural amenities through hotel taxes, 
and then use this economic benefit to boost their payrolls by either increasing their numbers or 
compensation.  
The key findings and new contributions to the literature are illustrated in the figure 
below, and can be stated as follows:  
• A ten percent in Hotel Revenue per Capita is associated with an increase of just under 1% 
(0.94%) in Local Government Wages per Capita (H1), 
• For every unit increase in the USDA Natural Amenities Scale (mediated by the influence of 
Hotel Revenue per Capita) there is an increase of 0.54% in Local Government Wages per 
Capita.  
• There is no direct association between the USDA Natural Amenities Scale and Local 
Government Wages per Capita, challenging previous research.  
 
 




Figure 7: New Contributions 
 
Hotel revenue per capita is a proxy for tourism tax revenue - which previous research 
indicates far exceeds the cost of providing services to the visitors who generate such taxes. The 
findings indicate that there is a strong association between these tourism-related taxes and local 
government wages. This finding indicates that at least some of the public economic benefits of 
tourism are being distributed to local government payrolls - either though exceptional wages or 
increased numbers of employees. This finding addresses a gap in the existing literature regarding 
the distribution of public economic benefits from tourism and the primary research question: 
How are the public economic benefits of the hospitality subsector distributed? Practitioners in 
both planning and public finance disciplines should consider how this finding could reshape 
local economic development initiatives targeted at the low-wage tourism sector.  
The findings also indicate an indirect association between natural amenities and local 
government wages when mediated by hotel revenue per capita. This validates previous research 




which found an association between natural amenities and tourism development (Marcouiller et 
al., 2004), but challenges previous research finding a direct association between natural 
amenities and local government wages per capita.  
This finding of a path from Natural Amenities to Hotel Revenue per Capita to Local 
Government Wages per Capita provides important foundational information for drawing 
conclusions relative to the wage structure problem in the tourism industry. Since the findings 
indicates that tourism monetizes natural amenities, and in turn, local governments use this value 
to boost their own wage structure, it suggests that solving the wage structure problem in the 
tourism industry may be rooted in how local planning and public finance practitioners apply the 
origins of tourism taxes to subsequent distribution policies. Do they consider the tourism tax 
revenue as a public economic benefit derived from local natural amenities, is it a product of 
private enterprise, or is the origin irrelevant and the economic benefit simply blended with other 
tax revenues during the budgeting process?  
If tourism tax revenue is directly associated with the natural amenities of a community, 
the potential exists, as with other unique revenues, that it could be tied to a specific public 
purpose associated with its origins. There are many examples of planners and public financial 
officials investing new incremental tax revenues in activities which are believed to generate 
those new revenues (i.e., office buildings and housing in targeted redevelopment areas, retail 
centers, and hotel development). In the hypothesis tested here, there are two ingredients that 
come together to generate the new revenue – natural amenities and tourism development. To 
date, the focus of practitioners and urban theorists Susan Fainstein and David Harvey has been 
that public and private investment in tourism development is the only source of this new tax 
revenue. This likely has shaped the reinvestment strategies of planners and public finance 




officials, and the solutions urban theorists have raised to address the wage structure problem in 
the tourism industry (extracting a share of private economic benefits to balance the distribution 
between labor and capital).   
These findings suggest that solving the wage problem in the tourism industry not only 
involves addressing the distribution of private economic benefits, as suggested by Susan 
Fainstein and David Harvey (Fainstein, 2010; Harvey, 2012), but requires attention to the bias of 
local policymakers in bending the distribution of public economic benefits for their own self-
enrichment (H1), and recognition that natural amenities are an important element of tourism 
development (H4). Public choice economists will not be surprised by the findings for Hypothesis 
#1. They will see the behavior quantified in the analysis as no more than rational actors pursing 
their own self-interests. For public administrators and planners charged with policymaking at the 
local level, however, this finding reveals a potential blind spot that raises questions about the 
techniques used to evaluate the benefits of tourism, transparency on the distribution of public 
economic benefits and about the limits of planners to address the wage problem in the tourism 
industry. The finding of a causal pathway between natural amenities and local government wages 
through hotel revenue raises questions about the ability of Power to Tax theory to stand alone, 
and the potential need to incorporate commons planning into local tourism policies. 
Other findings are 1) the association between Hotel Revenue per Capita and Local 
Government Wages per capita does not change materially between urban-rural population 
categories, 2) increased private union membership in a county is associated with slight increases 
in hotel clerk wages, and 3) there is a small negative relationship between the racial composition 
of supervisors and workers and worker wages. The existing literature suggests that rural counties 
can leverage natural amenities to develop a local tourism industry (Hassebrook, 2003).  While 




this may be true, the findings indicate that local governments in rural counties are not exploiting 
these natural amenities for financial gain any more so than their urban counterparts.   
The other two findings, while suffering from some limitations in the underlying data, address 
more direct ways in which wages are influenced in the tourism industry. The finding on union 
membership and wages answers the research question, have unions improved the wage structure 
in their local hospitality subsector (?), in the affirmative. There is a positive and statistically 
significant association between higher union participation and higher wages. This finding 
confirms prior research (Card, 2001; Mishel & Walters, 2003) and supports efforts that advocate 
for development of unions as a means to address the wage structure problem in the tourism 
industry.  
The finding on racial disparities between supervisors and line workers and minority wages 
answers the research question “do differences in race between front of house and back of house 
employees in the hospitality subsector reduce the wages of back of house employees?” The 
answer, subject to the limitations of the data, is yes, differences in race between supervisors and 
frontline employees in the housekeeping occupation is associated with reduced wages for 
frontline employees. There are significant limitations with these findings, as the data for 
occupations (housekeeping supervisors and housekeepers) can only be separated by industry at 
the State level. Therefore, the county data includes multiple industries which may have different 
dynamics than the hospitality subsector. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
To draw conclusions and make recommendations based on the findings of this 
dissertation I use Fainstein’s Just City Model of planning and the past work of tourism scholars 




and public choice economists. Fainstein’s system parallels, in part, the work of H. George 
Frederickson in the public administration literature. Frederickson challenged public 
administrators to think beyond whether a program is effective or good, but to consider for whom 
the program is effective and good (Frederickson, 1992). Fainstein’s Just City Model suggests a 
multi-dimensional planning approach to replace the current process-oriented model used in most 
urban settings. Fainstein adds the principles of equity and diversity to the existing emphasis 
planners place on democracy, encourages a more active role by planners in managing markets, 
empowers planners to become advocates for the disenfranchised, and emphasizes the strategic 
importance of information in a just planning process.  
The work of tourism scholars intersects with Fainstein’s recommended planning 
approach in some respects. The use of community benefit assessments to replace economic 
input-output models meets Fainstein’s objective of providing useful information to decision 
makers on matters of equity and diversity.  Another useful tool found among tourism 
practitioners are the micro-simulation models which detail the distribution of private economic 
benefits – a necessity if planners are to present options on how to direct these benefits for just 
outcomes (See Interim Hospitality Consultants). These models can also be modified by planners, 
with help from public finance colleagues, to assess the public economic benefits of individual 
business activities and industry sectors. Finally, there are several measures of equity and 
diversity being constructed and evaluated by scholars for developing countries which can be 
employed by planners in the United States (See Table 5). 
The work of public choice economists also intersects with Fainstein’s proposed planning 
approach. Public choice economists position government employees as rational actors. Their 
research, while often suggesting a lessor role for States with markets, can be incorporated by 




public officials to present a complete range of options to policymakers. Specifically, public 
officials should assess and present historical policy decisions through the lens of public choice 
theories. This includes measuring the effect of any rational acting which may have resulted in 
self-enrichment by public employees. Finally, the work of sociologists and heterodox economists 
on wage issues is another area of research which connects with Fainstein’s planning approach. 
The work of these researchers raises issues for planners with respect to wage standards, 
enforcement, and the distribution of private economic benefits.  For example, Edna Bonacich’s 
work, tested in this study, identifies the potential for unchecked systematic racism to suppress 
wages among workers of color.  
The findings of this dissertation suggest new areas for planners to consider when 
planning the distribution of economic benefits from tourism development. Below are four 
specific recommendations based on the existing literature and the findings of this study.  
1. Focus on the distribution of public economic benefits 
In addressing the wage problem in the tourism industry, Fainstein and Harvey focus their 
attention on the redistribution of private economic benefits. For several reasons, the distribution 
of public economic benefits is potentially a more fruitful starting place. First, visitors, either for 
business or pleasure, are unlikely to alter destinations based on hotel taxes. Raising taxes on 
these temporary residents is likely to be a continuing source of new revenue for local 
governments. Second, microsimulation models reveal that tax revenue received by local 
governments from hotel operations are roughly equal to the private economic benefits received 
by private capital (Interim Hospitality Consultants, 2013). Third, these public economic benefits 
are in large part associated with the natural amenities in a community (a form of commons) and 
the commodification of the hospitality of employees.  Since public economic benefits from 




hotels can be expanded (with higher taxes on visitors), are roughly equal to the private economic 
benefits accruing to private capital, are generated in part by the commons and the hospitality of 
residents, and controlled by local government employees and elected officials, there is the 
opportunity for adopting policies which direct some of these public economic benefits to address 
the wage structure problem in the industry.  
2. Consider the past and present influence of rational actors 
One of the focusses of public choice economics is the rational behavior of politicians and 
public employees - while public administration and planning scholars generally presume that 
public servants suppress self-interests. This study reveals that public economic benefits from 
tourism are partly directed to self-enrichment of local government employees – including the 
planners and public administrators charged with crafting policy options which could address the 
wage structure problem in the tourism industry. This finding, combined with previous findings in 
research conducted by public choice economists Brueckner, Neumark and Diamond (Brueckner 
& Neumark, 2014; Diamond, 2017) suggests the need for reflexivity among public officials 
involved in the distribution of public economic benefits.   
Specifically, public officials should consider reviewing past allocations of public 
economic benefits and consider process changes to make the distribution decisions more 
transparent. Working together with public finance colleagues, planners should identify the full 
distribution of public economic benefits (investment in tourist attractions, offsets to resident 
taxes, subsidies to tourism developers, and any boost to public payrolls). A full accounting of 
past distributions, compared against the historic wages of tourism employees, will allow elected 
officials, unions, businesses, and employees to critique past outcomes (intended or unintended) 
and develop a fuller range of recommendations on future distributions.  




To this end, local government officials should develop Community Benefit Assessment 
(CBA) models to measure the distribution of past and project future public economic benefits. 
The CBA approach can tie the economic activity of tourism directly to the benefits received by 
public entities and employees in the industry. Conversely, the use of economic input-output 
models should be limited to comparing public investments options among several projects or 
industries, and not be used for standalone justifications for investments in individual projects. 
3. Promote Integrated Planning 
 The methods and findings of this dissertation suggest that planners alone cannot address 
the distribution of public economic benefits from tourism. Analyzing the public investment and 
distribution of associated economic benefits and determining options to alter past practices and 
policies requires an interdisciplinary team within local government. The team should be 
comprised of employees with backgrounds in planning, public finance, demographics, and local 
economic development. Public finance officials can identify the direct and indirect financial 
assistance to the industry, as well as the distribution of public economic benefits. Planners and 
local economic development officials can identify and quantify the value of regulatory incentives 
granted for new development. Demographers can analyze wage and demographic data to 
determine the nature of the wage problem in the tourism industry for a specific community and 
distribution across groups.   
 An interdisciplinary team would have breadth of knowledge and experience with public 
interventions which could be adapted or modified to address the wage structure problem in 
tourism. For example, public finance and economic development officials could assess the 
potential for new taxes (achieved either by higher tax rates or industry growth) to be used to 




mitigate wage problems. These officials have experience using tax growth to achieve public 
objectives.  
Pledging future increases in taxes, commonly referred to as tax increment financing 
(TIF), is a common practice to meet the objectives of a community. TIF funds from property and 
sales taxes are often used for private development or public projects (i.e., community centers, 
cultural amenities) as a catalyst for increasing tourism. Adding wage equity to the list of uses of 
TIF funds and adding transient occupancy taxes to the sources of TIF funds are both logical 
extensions of existing practices by local governments. And for hotel developments which do not 
request development assistance and are not required by local ordinances to provide living wages 
to workers, rebating a portion of the local government’s windfall in new hotel taxes to achieve 
higher wages, is also an extension of existing practices. Local governments routinely provide 
financial assistance to project developers who do not request assistance to achieve public 
objectives (i.e., community spaces, public art, architectural and design elements, etc.). 
Beyond employing a team approach to address specific projects and social equity 
concerns, planners, public finance officials and public administrators in general, should consider 
joining the planning processes conducted by planners, and those conducted by public finance 
officers. The split planning process employed today, where planners prepare general and 
community specific plans, and public finance officers prepare operating and capital expenditure 
plans, allows critical issues to be addressed with only part of the local government’s resources 
and expertise. Combining these two planning processes would create better information for 
policymakers and community members and expand the benefits of interdisciplinary teams from a 
project basis to all priorities and policies of the jurisdiction.  




4. New strategic considerations and measures for Fainstein’s Just City Model 
Fainstein’s recommended planning model for a Just City includes 1) recognition of the 
State’s role in public investment and regulation, 2) recognition of the strategic importance of 
information to achieve just ends, and 3) adding equity and diversity (to democracy) to the 
principles which should guide planners Based on the findings in this study, I recommend that 
integrated planning and reflexivity (as discussed above) be added to Fainstein’s strategic 
considerations and that measures relating to equity (i.e., local wages) extend the scope of the  
model. These measures would 1) establish a community baseline on matters of equity and 
diversity and 2) permit specific goal setting in the planning process. The wage measures 
suggested are the living wage metric discussed in Chapter 2 and the identifying any split labor 
markets as posed by Edna Bonacich (Bonacich, 1972).   These new elements are indicated in 
italics in Figure 8 below.  
Figure 8: Fainstein's Just City Planning Model & Recommended Additions (italics/bold) 
 







1. Other tourism subsectors 
Future research on the lines of this dissertation can explore other segments of the tourism 
industry which benefit from public investment or generate significant tax revenues for State and 
local governments. Airports and rental car companies would be appropriate to study given the 
near exclusivity of these businesses in supporting tourism. Restaurants and retail are also worthy 
of study, but these industries would likely be difficult to connect with public tourism investment 
since they are highly dependent on the patronage of area residents. Studies of those subsectors 
which rely on the income and spending power of area residents and can involve inter-
jurisdictional competition for sales taxes and would need to consider public investment and 
regulatory relief beyond tourism-related activities.  


















2. Evaluate Split Labor Markets within and across multiple industries 
The split labor market component of this dissertation is worthy of additional study. The 
alignment of supervisor-employee classifications within the hospitality subsector was not ideal, 
but there could be better matches within other industry sectors, or across multiple industries.  
This would require extensive research to identify highly matched classifications, but the analysis 
which followed would permit stronger conclusions from the statistical analyses.  In addition, a 
baseline study of the association of the racial composition of the target employment 
classification and wages would be an interesting and important addition to the hierarchal 
regression analysis. This approach would reveal the contribution the racial composition of the 
workforce makes to wage rates - before the racial disparity between supervisor and employee is 
considered.   
This is an important area of study for planners since there are few, if any, remedies for 
the residents in their communities to address this problem. The path for employees to recover 
wages lost to systematic racism is generally through the court system which requires substantial 
time and financial resources. Addressing split labor markets in the planning process, with the 
support of demographers and public finance specialists, is consistent with Fainstein’s 
recommendations for a justice-oriented planning approach. 
3. Review impact of wage ordinances on tourism economics 
Another perspective on the wage problem in the tourism industry could be gained by 
considering how local living wage ordinances in tourist destinations impact employment and 
business revenue. Using a regression discontinuity design, the impact of wage ordinances could 
be assessed by analyzing wage and revenue data prior to and after the effective date of the wage 
ordinances. The City of Seattle is one example of a tourist destination which recently adopted 




such an ordinance. This type of study could identify how the redistribution of economic benefits 
impacts residents (through increased wages), the local service economy (more spending by 
residents due to higher wages) and tourism-based businesses (response to increased expenses).  
4. Covid 19 and tourism resiliency 
The impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on tourism presents another potential dimension to 
explore. The crippling effect of the pandemic on tourism will result in many tourism-dependent 
businesses seeking bankruptcy protections or public subsidies to remain viable until the 
pandemic is under control. The significant amount of regulatory relief and direct public 
investment in these businesses will allow local government to potentially reset wage expectations 
for the industry, which in turn could be absorbed in the post-pandemic valuation of the real estate 
and fixed assets associated with tourism businesses (i.e., hotels, airplanes, rental cars). Public 
policies in the form of bankruptcy laws have permitted businesses to reset asset values in the past 
based on changes in economic conditions, so it would not be unprecedented for a new wage 
structure to be adopted as a condition of business accessing this public benefit. Assessing the use 
of bankruptcy protections by tourism-related business and the distribution of public and private 
economic benefits during the recovery of the industry, would be instructive in assessing the 
capacity of counter-cyclical policy interventions. This link between asset valuations and wage 
rates would be a valuable contribution to the emerging field of Domicology: the study of real 
estate, social equity, and sustainability. 
  




Appendix A: Living Wage Data from Prospective Business Class Hotel Model  
The table below presents employee wages in the Montevallo model with a column 
indicating whether or not the wage meets or exceed the estimated living wage for the area. I use 
the MIT wage calculator to estimate the living wage in Shelby County Alabama (Glasmeier, 
2016) where the City of Montevallo is located. The living wage for a single person in Shelby 
County is estimated to be $10.98 per hour. Of the 34 positions budgeted for this hotel project, 
seven positions are scheduled to make more than the estimated living wage (Interim Hospitality 
Consultants, 2013). 
Table A- 1: Wage Schedule for Business Class Hotel Model 
Position 
Full-
Time Part-time Hourly Rate Salary 




General Manager 1   $50,000 Yes 
Secretary/Accounting 1   $40,000 Yes 
Sales and Marketing  1  $27,000 Yes 
Chief Engineer 1   $40,000 Yes 
Repair/Maintenance  1 $8.50  No 
Host (Front Desk) 5 3 $9.00  No 
Night Auditor 1 1 $11.00  Yes 
Hostess (Breakfast)  2 $8.50  No 
Hostess (Social Hour)  1 $8.50  No 
Executive Housekeeper 1  ---- $40,000 Yes 
Inspectress Staff 1  $8.50  No 
Houseman Staff 1 1 $8.50  No 
Laundry 1 1 $8.50  No 
Housekeepers 6 4 $8.50  No 
Total 19 15    
Source data: Interim Hospitality Consultants 2011 and MIT Living Wage Calculator 
  




Appendix B: Data Cleaning Steps 
 
Univariate screening 
Input errors: All data sets were created by large professional data collection organizations, so it 
was presumed that data was inputted correctly, or that any errors were corrected since the 
original publication of the data.  Also, in the unlikely event that input errors remained 
uncorrected, it was assumed that those errors would be identified with other screening techniques 
applied to the data. 
Missing data: If more than 10% of data was missing, processes to estimate data were explored. 
After an estimation process was determined and executed, the randomness of the remaining 
missing data was tested to assess any potential for bias. If the missing data was non-random, 
options to trim the data set were explored. After all steps were taken any non-randomness 
remaining was noted as a limitation (potential bias).  
Univariate Outliers: Z scores were created for each case. Any values above or below 3.3 SD 
from the mean, based on the recommended approach established by Tabachnick (2013, p 73), 
were reviewed for possible input errors and extreme outliers. If the data was accurate, there were 
just a few extreme outliers, all data was evaluated in the bivariate screening. This way, for 
example, a county with extremely high housing costs was not eliminated, unless there were not 
similarly high values for wages in that county. 
Bivariate Screening 
Linearity: X-Y Scatter Plots were prepared to identify outliers and check for linear distribution. 
Extreme outliers were removed if there were more than a small percentage (per Tabachnick, 
2013). Statistical analyses were conducted with and without these outliers. In all cases the 
outliers increased the strength of the association being tested. To be conservative, the outliers 




were removed. Transformation was considered if relationships were not linear, however, no data 
was transformed due to non-linearity. 
Distribution of data (Normality): Histograms with overlays of normal distribution curves lines 
were created to evaluate the shape of distribution. Transformation was then considered following 
guidelines of Tabachnick (2013, p. 87-89). Linear regression is sensitive to distribution of data. 
Highly positively or negatively skewed data was transformed by calculating the square root or 
common log of the data. The distribution of this transformed data was then assessed to select the 
best version to use in the statistical analysis. A common log (10) transformation was conducted 
with several variables (Local government wages, hotel revenue, and median gross rent). 
Multivariate Screening 
Multivariate Outliers: A preliminary regression analysis was conducted for each hypothesis and 
Mahalanobis Distance calculations were saved. The Mahalanobis outlier threshold, based on a 
chi Square table using .001 as the cutoff were: 2 degrees of freedom (df) = 13.82, 3 df = 16.27, 
and 4 df = 18.47. Discretion was exercised removing these outliers based on the number and 
nature of the cases identified. Several cases were removed as multivariate outliers based on this 
test.  
Distribution (heteroscedasticity): A second preliminary regression analysis was conducted if 
multivariate outliers were removed. A scatter plot was prepared for the residuals to confirm that 
cases were centered around zero in a circular distribution.  Extreme outliers were removed based 
on visual inspection, and if the distribution was not centered symmetrically around zero, 
transformation of variables was revisited. No cases were removed as a result of this test and no 
transformations were conducted. 




Multicollinearity of Variables: Partial correlations were conducted and reviewed during the final 
regression analysis to ensure there was no significant correlations between variables. No issues 
were found with this test. 
  




Appendix C: Graphs and Tables used in Data Cleaning 
 
Local Government Wages per Capita 
 
Figure C- 1: Distribution of Data prior to Transformation 
 
 
Table C- 1: Transformation Options for Local Government Wages Per Capita Data 
Statistics 
 WagCap14 WagCap14SQR WagCap14L10 
N Valid 2954 2954 2954 
Missing 191 191 191 
Skewness 4.051 1.910 .808 
Std. Error of Skewness .045 .045 .045 
Kurtosis 33.660 7.808 1.670 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .090 .090 .090 
 
Key: WagCap14: Local Government Wages per Capita; WagCap14SQR: SQRT (Local Government Wages per 
Capita); WagCap14L10: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita). 




Figure C- 2: Distribution of Data for Local Government Wages after Transformation 
 
Key: WagCap14L10: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) 
Hotel Revenue Per Capita 
Table C- 2: Correlation among Hotel Data 
 
Key: RCPTOT: Annual Hotel Revenue, PAYANN: Annual Hotel Payroll, Emp: Number of Hotel Employees, 
ESTAB: Number of Hotel Establishments 
 
 




Figure C- 3: Distribution of Hotel Revenue Per Capita Data 
 
Key: RevCap12: Hotel Revenue per Capita 
Table C- 3: Hotel Revenue Per Capita Data after Transformation 
Statistics 
 RevCap12 RevCap12SQR RevCap12L10 
N Valid 2926 2926 2926 
Missing 219 219 219 
Skewness 23.400 4.476 .349 
Std. Error of Skewness .045 .045 .045 
Kurtosis 811.758 41.462 .551 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .090 .090 .090 
 
Key: RevCap12: Hotel Revenue per Capita; RevCap12SQR: SQRT (Hotel Revenue per Capita; RevCap12L10: Log 
(Hotel Revenue per Capita). 
 




Figure C- 4: Common Log of Hotel Revenue Per Capita 
 
Key: ReveCap12L10: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) 
 
Natural Amenities 
Figure C- 5: Distribution of Natural Amenities Scale 
 
Key: NASscale: Natural Amenities Scale 




Median Gross Rent (H1-H5) 
Figure C- 6: Distribution of Median Gross Rent 
 
Key: MGRent: Median Gross Rent 
 
Table C- 4: Transformation of Median Gross Rent 
 
Key: MGRent: Median Gross Rent; RentSQRT: SQRT (Median Gross Rent; RentLog10: Log (Median Gross Rent) 




Figure C- 7: Transformation of Median Gross Rent 
 
Key: RentLog10: Log (Median Gross Rent) 
Bivariate Screening (H1-H5) 
Figure C- 8: Bivariate Screening of Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) and Log (Hotel Revenue Per Capita) 
 
Key: RevCap12L10: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) 





Figure C- 9: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) and Natural Amenities 
 
Outliers: : 21: New York County, New York; 748: Alpine County, California; 1844: Love County, Oklahoma; 2269: Swain 
County, North Carolina, 2879: Menominee County, Wisconsin. 
Key: WagCap14L10: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita); NASscale: Natural Amenities Scale. 
 
Figure C- 10: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) and Natural Amenities 
 
Outliers: 1314: Tazewell County, Illinois 
Key: RevCap12L10: Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita); NASscale: Natural Amenities Scale. 




Figure C- 11: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) and Log (Median Gross Rent) 
 
Outliers: 2269: Swain County, North Carolina; 2879: Menominee County, Wisconsin; 129: North Slope Borough, Alaska; 21: 
New York County, New York; 15: Honolulu County, Hawaii; 50: District of Columbia, District of Columbia; 161: Bronx 
County, New York; 87 Kings County, New York; 36: Queens County, New York; 93: Richmond County, New York. 
Key: WagCap12L10: Log (Local Government Wages per Capita); RentLog10: Log (Median Gross Rent). 
 
Table C- 5: Outliers Removed 
Outliers Removed Based on Bivariate Analysis 
1.      Alpine County, California 
2.      Bronx County, New York 
3.      District of Columbia, District of Columbia 
4.      Honolulu County, Hawaii 
5.      Kings County, New York 
6.      Love County Oklahoma 
7.      Menominee County, Wisconsin 
8.      New York County, New York 
9.      North Slope Borough, Alaska 
10.    Queens County, New York 
11.    Richmond County, New York 
12.    Swain County, North Carolina 
 
 




Hotel Clerk Wages (H6) 
Figure C- 12: Hotel Clerk Mean Hourly Wage 
 
Key: H_Mean: Hotel Clerk Hourly Mean Wage 
 
Figure C- 13: Log (Mean Hourly Hotel Clerk Wages) 
 
Key: H_MEAN_L10: Log (Mean Hourly Hotel Clerk Wages) 




Union Membership (H6) 
Figure C- 14: Private Union Membership Percentage 
 




Figure C- 15: Log (Private Union Membership Percentage) 
 
Key: PvMemPctL10: Log (Percentage of Private Union Membership) 
 




Median Gross Rent (H6) 
Figure C- 16: Median Gross Rent 
 
Key: RentMSA: Median Gross Rent 
Figure C- 17: Log (Median Gross Rent) 
 
Key: L10Rent: Log (Median Gross Rent) 
 




Bivariate Screening (H6) 
Figure C- 18: Log (Mean Hotel Clerk Hourly Wage) & Log (Private Union Membership Percentage) 
 
Key: H_Mean_L10: Log (Hotel Clerk Hourly Mean Wage); PvMemPctL10: Log (Percentage of Private Union Membership) 
 
Figure C- 19: Log (Mean Hotel Clerk Hourly Wages) & Log (Median Gross Rent) 
 
Key: H_Mean_L10: Log (Hotel Clerk Hourly Mean Wage); L10Rent: Log (Median Gross Rent). 
 




Housekeeping Wages (H7) 
Figure C- 20: Mean Housekeeping Hourly Wages 
 
Key: H_MEAN_HK: Housekeeping Hourly Mean Wage 
 
Table C- 6: Transformation of Mean Housekeeping Wages 
Statistics 
 H_MEAN_HK WageLog10 
N Valid 359 359 
Missing 0 0 
Mean 9.5192 .9764 
Median 9.3100 .9689 
Std. Deviation 1.00433 .04312 
Variance 1.009 .002 
Skewness 1.555 1.129 
Std. Error of Skewness .129 .129 
Kurtosis 3.742 1.903 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .257 .257 
Range 6.33 .25 
Minimum 8.00 .90 
Maximum 14.33 1.16 
 
Key: H_MEAN_HK: Housekeeping Hourly Mean Wage; WageLog10: Log (Housekeeping Hourly Mean Wage). 





Figure C- 21: Log (Mean Housekeeping Hourly Wages) 
 
Key: WageLog10: Log (Housekeeping Hourly Mean Wage). 
 
Supervisor-Employee Racial Composition Gap (H7) 
Figure C- 22: Racial Gap between Housekeeping Supervisors and Housekeepers 
 
Key: RaceGap: Difference in racial composition of housekeeping supervisors and housekeepers.  
 




Median Gross Rent (H7) 
Figure C- 23: Median Gross Rent 2010 
 
Key: Estimate!!Median gross rent: Median Gross Rent 
 
Table C- 7: Median Gross Rent and Log (Median Gross Rent) 
 
 Median gross rent MedRentLog10 
N Valid 359 359 
Missing 0 0 
Mean 759.58 2.8717 
Median 716.00 2.8549 
Std. Deviation 162.496 .08557 
Variance 26404.858 .007 
Skewness 1.320 .762 
Std. Error of Skewness .129 .129 
Kurtosis 1.928 .349 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .257 .257 
Range 913 .46 
Minimum 484 2.68 
Maximum 1397 3.15 
Key: MedRentLog10: Log (Median Gross Rent) 




Figure C- 24: Log (Median Gross Rent) 
 
Key: MedRentLog10: Log (Median Gross Rent) 
 
Bivariate Screening (H7) 
Figure C- 25: Log (Housekeeping Wages) and Race Gap 
 
 
Outliers: 357: New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA Metro Area, 358: Honolulu, HI Metro 
Area, 359: Kingston, NY Metro Area, 3: San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA Metro Area, 9: Bridgeport-Stamford-
Norwalk, CT Metro Area, 13: Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH Metro Area,21: Las Vegas-Paradise, NV Metro 
Area. 
Key: WageLog10: Log (Housekeeping wages), RaceGap: Difference in supervisor-employee racial composition 




Figure C- 26: Log (Mean Hourly Housekeeping Wage) and Log (Median Gross Rent) 
 
Key: WageLog10: Log (Mean Hourly Housekeeping Wage); MedRentLog10: Log (Median Gross Rent) 
Figure C- 27: Residual Plot for Hypothesis 7 
 
Key: WageLog10: Log (Mean Hourly Housekeeping Wage) 
 
  




Appendix D: PROCESS Output for Mediation Model 
 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
 
***************** PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Version 3.5 ***************** 
 
          Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.       www.afhayes.com 
    Documentation available in Hayes (2018). www.guilford.com/p/hayes3 
 
************************************************************************** 
Model  : 4 
    Y  : WagCap_1 = Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) 
    X  : NASscale = USDA Natural Amenities Scale 










 RevCap_1 = Log (Hotel Revenue per Capita) 
 
Model Summary 
          R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p 
      .3498      .1224      .2751   188.8792     2.0000  2709.0000      .0000 
 
Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant    -1.1802      .3065    -3.8510      .0001    -1.7811     -.5793 
NASscale      .0554  a   .0048    11.4905      .0000      .0459      .0649 
RentLog1     1.2203      .1083    11.2637      .0000     1.0078     1.4327 
 
Standardized coefficients 
              coeff 
NASscale      .2179 
RentLog1      .2136 
 
Covariance matrix of regression parameter estimates: 
           constant   NASscale   RentLog1 
constant      .0939      .0005     -.0332 
NASscale      .0005      .0000     -.0002 




 WagCap_1 = Log (Local Government Wages per Capita) 
 
Model Summary 
          R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p 
      .3436      .1181      .0214   120.8556     3.0000  2708.0000      .0000 
 
Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 




constant     3.0296      .0858    35.3287      .0000     2.8615     3.1978 
NASscale     -.0020 c’   .0014    -1.4714      .1413     -.0047      .0007 
RevCap_1      .0978 b    .0054    18.2339      .0000      .0872      .1083 
RentLog1     -.0034      .0309     -.1104      .9121     -.0641      .0572 
 
Standardized coefficients 
              coeff 
NASscale     -.0286 
RevCap_1      .3513 
RentLog1     -.0021 
 
Covariance matrix of regression parameter estimates: 
           constant   NASscale   RevCap_1   RentLog1 
constant      .0074      .0000      .0000     -.0026 
NASscale      .0000      .0000      .0000      .0000 
RevCap_1      .0000      .0000      .0000      .0000 
RentLog1     -.0026      .0000      .0000      .0010 
 
Test(s) of X by M interaction: 
          F        df1        df2          p 
    12.4989     1.0000  2707.0000      .0004 
 





          R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p 
      .0990      .0098      .0240    13.4049     2.0000  2709.0000      .0000 
 
Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant     2.9142      .0906    32.1651      .0000     2.7366     3.0919 
NASscale      .0034  c   .0014     2.3774      .0175      .0006      .0062 
RentLog1      .1159      .0320     3.6181      .0003      .0531      .1787 
 
Standardized coefficients 
              coeff 
NASscale      .0479 
RentLog1      .0729 
 
Covariance matrix of regression parameter estimates: 
           constant   NASscale   RentLog1 
constant      .0082      .0000     -.0029 
NASscale      .0000      .0000      .0000 
RentLog1     -.0029      .0000      .0010 
 
****************** CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MODEL RESIDUALS ****************** 
 
           RevCap_1   WagCap_1 
RevCap_1     1.0000      .0000 
WagCap_1      .0000     1.0000 
 
************** TOTAL, DIRECT, AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y ************** 
 
Total effect of X on Y 
     Effect         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI       c_ps       c_cs 




      .0034 c     .0014     2.3774      .0175      .0006      .0062      .0218      .0479 
 
Direct effect of X on Y 
     Effect         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI      c'_ps      c'_cs 
     -.0020  c’   .0014    -1.4714      .1413     -.0047      .0007     -.0130     -.0286 
 
Indirect effect(s) of X on Y: 
             Effect     BootSE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
RevCap_1      .0054 ab     .0006      .0043      .0066 
 
Partially standardized indirect effect(s) of X on Y: 
             Effect     BootSE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
RevCap_1      .0348      .0036      .0278      .0420 
 
Completely standardized indirect effect(s) of X on Y: 
             Effect     BootSE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
RevCap_1      .0765      .0081      .0610      .0928 
 
*********************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS ************************ 
 
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output: 
  95.0000 
 
Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals: 
  5000 
 
WARNING: Variables names longer than eight characters can produce incorrect 
output 
when some variables in the data file have the same first eight characters. 
Shorter 
variable names are recommended. By using this output, you are accepting all 
risk 
and consequences of interpreting or reporting results that may be incorrect. 
 
------ END MATRIX ----- 
  




Appendix E: Transformation of Results 
 
The output of the linear regression models which included log transformed data was transformed 
for easier interpretation in an Excel worksheet. The calculations are outlined on the University of 
Virginia library website. For details and examples see:  
https://data.library.virginia.edu/interpreting-log-transformations-in-a-linear-model/ 
In summary: 




With this value, the results can be stated as, for a one unit increase in the independent variable, 
the dependent variable increases/decreases by (transformed coefficient) 




With this value, a 1% increase in the independent variable increases (or decreases) the dependent 
variable by the transformed coefficient.  
Both dependent/response variable and independent/predictor variable(s) are log-
transformed: 
Interpret the coefficient as the percent increase in the dependent variable for every 1% increase 
in the independent variable.  
 
  
(Exp (Coefficient)-1) * 100 = Transformed Coefficient 
Coefficient/100 = Transformed Coefficient 
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